5

On Unifi cation: Taking Technical Functions as Objective (and

Biological Functions as Subjective)

5.1 Introduction

Biological items and technical artifacts have in common that they both allow functional
descriptions. Yet these descriptions seem to differ substantially, making it diffi cult to
capture them in one uniform theory. Biological functions are typically taken as objective
nonrelational properties of items that do not depend on biological context or the mental
states of agents, whereas technical functions are seen as subjective relations between arti-
facts and their technical context including the mental states of agents. Biological functions
are, moreover, typically taken as properties that items have, whereas technical functions
are sometimes merely seen as relations that agents ascribe to artifacts.
These contrasts between biological and technical functions are not supported by philo-
sophical analyses. The question of how functional descriptions are to be understood in
biology and technology is not yet settled, and answers are limiting the mentioned contrasts.
In the main candidates for theories of biological functions,^1 items have functions relative
to contexts, such as their evolutionary pasts, the capacities of the organisms of which the
items are a part, or the selective regimes they are subjected to. Biological functions thus
seem not to be nonrelational properties but also relations that items have relative to
context. On particular function theories the contrasts even seems to disappear. According
to John R. Searle (1995), biological functions are ascribed to items relative to goals agents
impose on organisms, turning biological functions also into subjective relations agents
ascribe relative to their mental states. Conversely, technical functions of components of
artifacts may in Robert Cummins’s (1975) theory be taken as physical capacities of the
components that causally contribute to physical capacities of the artifacts, turning technical
functions into objective relations components have independent of the mental states of
agents.
In this contribution I argue that the alleged differences between biological and technical
functions to a large extent can be avoided. This argument is not a defense of the theories
of Searle or Cummins. Instead I accept the main candidates for biological function
theories by assuming that biological functions are objective relations that items have

Pieter E. Vermaas