On Unifi cation: Taking Technical Functions as Objective 71
Taking technical function as partly subjective does not seem to be problematic. Artifacts
are designed and used by agents for their functions, and this introduces an acceptable
relation between technical functions and the mental states—intentions and purposes—of
designers and users. In many theories of technical functions, such mental states actually
play a role.^2 In intentional theories this role is made explicit: in, for instance, Karen
Neander’s theory, the function of an artifact “is the purpose or end for which it was
designed, made, or (minimally) put in place or retained by an agent” (1991: 462). In
etiological theories such as Ruth Garrett Millikan’s (1984; 1993) and Beth Preston’s
(1998), mental states are a bit more hidden: technical functions correspond in these
theories (in part) to the capacities for which artifacts have been reproduced by designers
or through user-demands over a period of time, relating technical functions to the purposes
held by numerous designers and/or users. These roles of mental states introduce
clearly a subjective component to the understanding of technical functions. Yet accepting
technical functions as merely subjective is problematic, since this seems to deny,
for instance, objective limitations encountered in designing and using artifacts: engineers
have to take into account scientifi c and technological constraints when creating artifacts
with specifi c functions, and we cannot simply use a given artifact for any function we may
have in mind. Technical functions seem to be partially objective, and ignoring this leads
to all kinds of problematic consequences. If in Neander’s theory an agent intentionally
stores a sugar cube for generating electricity by nuclear fusion, the cube has nuclear fusion
as its function for this agent. Yet sugar cubes are not reported to have been ascribed this
function and engineers will readily deny that an act of storage may alter that
observation.
Technical functions are thus better taken as partially subjective and partially objective,
which is made possible by distinguishing an epistemic and an ontological sense of the
objective-subjective distinction (Searle 1995: 7–9).
Epistemic sense (applying to judgments)
A judgment is epistemically subjective if the facts that make it true or false are dependent
on attitudes, feelings, and points of view of the makers and the hearers of the judgment.
A judgment is epistemically objective if the facts that make it true or false are independent
of anybody’s attitudes or feelings about these facts.
Ontological sense (applying to entities)
An entity is ontologically subjective if its mode of existence depends on mental states
of agents.
An entity is ontologically objective if its mode of existence is independent of any mental
state.
Searle’s examples of epistemic subjective and objective judgments are “Rembrandt is a
better artist than Rubens” and “Rembrandt lived in Amsterdam during the year 1632,”