72 Pieter E. Vermaas
respectively; the examples of ontologically subjective and objective entities are “pains”
and “mountains,” respectively.
With these distinctions in place, it can be observed that understanding the subjectivity
of technical functions as ontological is not problematic; taking the existence of technical
functions as depending on mental states seems fi ne. Understanding the subjectivity of
technical functions as epistemic is, however, not attractive given the earlier-mentioned
limitations on designing and using; judgments about technical functions do not seem to
be judgments whose truth depends on the “attitudes, feelings, and points of view” of the
agents making these judgments.
So if biological functions are to be objective whereas technical functions are to be sub-
jective, there is reason to limit this contrast to the ontological sense only. In the next section
I introduce an example of a theory for technical functions that meets this requirement.
5.3 Epistemic and Ontological Function Theories
The second element identifi ed in the differences between biological and technical func-
tions is that biological functions are relations that items have whereas technical functions
are relations that are ascribed by agents to artifacts.
Taking technical functions as relations that agents ascribe seems again not to be prob-
lematic. Technical functions are, as noted in section 5.2, related to the intentions and pur-
poses of agents. Hence it seems perfectly acceptable to maintain that these agents ascribe
technical functions to artifacts relative to these intentions and purposes. This, moreover,
does not rule out that technical functions are also relations that artifacts have relative to
context; by maintaining that technical functions are ascribed, one just emphasizes, say,
that technical functions come into existence in designing and using due to the intentions
and purposes of the agents involved. Taking technical functions merely as relations that
agents ascribe may to some still be acceptable, but it is problematic to those who wish to
arrive at a uniform function theory: if it is beyond doubt that biological functions are rela-
tions that items have, then technical functions should also be relations that artifacts
have.
Let us call theories in which biological or technical functions are relations that items
have relative to context “ontological function theories,” and let us call theories in which
functions are ascribed by agents “epistemic function theories.” These labels do not fully
pinpoint the purport of the distinction but capture the types of tasks involved: for ontologi-
cal function theories, one has to single out functions as relations between items and con-
texts, relations that in principle may exist “out there”; for epistemic function theories, the
task is to determine the conditions under which agents are justifi ed to describe items
functionally relative to context, independent of whether or not functions are relations that
those items have. Or to make a connection with Searle’s two senses of the objective-