80 Pieter E. Vermaas
The judgment whether the identifi ed requirement R 2 (xφc) holds does not depend on the
attitudes, feelings, and points of view of the agents making the judgment, showing that
the technical functions advanced in the constructed ontological ICE theory are epistemi-
cally objective. Yet the existence of technical functions does depend on the intentions and
purposes of the designers of the use plans for these artifacts. Hence technical functions
are ontologically subjective in the ontological ICE theory.
A full assessment of the acceptability of this ontological ICE theory must consist by
my own standards of an argument that it meets the four desiderata for theories of technical
functions given in Vermaas and Houkes (2003). I focus here on only one because the
proof that the ontological ICE theory meets this desideratum needs additional argumenta-
tion. It is called the “malfunction desideratum” and requires that function theories should
accommodate the phenomenon of malfunctioning by being able to ascribe the relevant
functions to artifacts that are—temporarily—not capable of performing their functions.
This desideratum may be taken as a necessary condition to a stronger requirement that a
function theory should model all possible aspects of malfunctioning, such as normative
statements that artifacts not capable of performing their functions are nevertheless sup-
posed to be capable of performing these functions. Such additional aspects of malfunc-
tioning are not considered here, but are discussed in this volume by Maarten Franssen
and Peter McLaughlin.
The original epistemic ICE theory meets the malfunctioning desideratum partially. In
the case that an artifact does not have a capacity to φ and that the agent a is ignorant about
this state of affairs, the original epistemic ICE theory allows that the agent still ascribes
this capacity as a function to the artifact; assuming that the E condition is satisfi ed, the
agent can in this case still believe that the artifact has the capacity to φ (thus satisfying
the I condition) and justify this belief, say, on the basis of earlier experiences with the
artifact (satisfying also the C condition). (Note, however, that as soon as the agent a
believes that the artifact does not have the capacity to φ, the agent cannot satisfy the I
condition anymore and thus can no longer ascribe this capacity as a function.) For the
ontological ICE-theory this case is not available: if an artifact does not have a capacity,
this capacity cannot be a function of the artifact.^3 Hence it seems that in the ontological
ICE theory, malfunctioning artifacts do not have their relevant functions. To mend this
problem I focus in the next section on the phenomenon of malfunctioning.
5.6 Malfunctioning
A function theory can accommodate malfunctioning if it, as said, can ascribe the relevant
function to an artifact even if the artifact is not capable of performing that function. For
a theory in which functions refer to capacities, this means that it can ascribe the relevant
capacity to φ as a function even if the artifact is not capable of exercising this capacity.