On Unifi cation: Taking Technical Functions as Objective 81
Cummins’s theory cannot accommodate malfunctioning for this reason, since in this theory
capability of exercising a capacity to φ—of φ-ing—is a necessary condition to ascribing
that capacity as a function. For the ontological ICE theory, this quick conclusion does not
hold. In this theory a capability of exercising a capacity to φ is not required for ascribing
that capacity as a function to the artifact; the necessary condition is rather that the artifact
has the capacity to φ. Hence if it can be made plausible that there is a difference between
having a capacity to φ and being capable of exercising this capacity, then there is room
for arguing that the ontological ICE theory can accommodate malfunctioning.
In the domain of technology, I believe there is such room. Take a car that is not capable
of being driven. This fact need not immediately lead to the conclusion that it has lost the
capacity to be driven; the reasonableness of this conclusion seems to depend on additional
circumstances. If, for instance, the car was set on fi re and was heavily damaged, it would
indeed be taken as having lost this capacity; but when the car has simply run out of petrol
or when the starting motor is broken, it is somewhat harsh to claim that the car no longer
has the capacity to be driven. It still has this capacity, which is demonstrated when it is
again fi lled up with petrol or when the starter is replaced. Hence one can envisage circum-
stances in which a car can be taken as both having a capacity and as not being fi t for this
capacity to be exercised. Assuming that in all of these circumstances the car is malfunc-
tioning, however, does not make sense. If the starting motor is damaged, the car may be
taken as malfunctioning, but when it needs petrol, saying the car is malfunctioning seems
like overkill.
So one can argue that an artifact can have a capacity to φ corresponding to its function
even in cases where the artifact is not capable of exercising this capacity. Yet these latter
cases should not all be taken as ones in which the artifact is malfunctioning. Hence what
is needed is to distinguish these cases, and my proposal is to do so using use plans and
the concepts of reparation and maintenance.
First, an artifact may be said to have the capacity to φ corresponding to its function if
it is in a physical state in which it is actually capable of exercising this capacity or if it
can be brought to such a state by repair or maintenance; in all other circumstances the
artifact does not have the capacity to φ. This fi rst distinction depends on how the notion
of reparation and maintenance is understood, and collapses if one allows reparation or
maintenance to refer to any possible or impossible transformations of the physical states
of artifacts. So to rule out repairs in which completely wrecked cars are part by part trans-
formed into their original state, and to discard magical acts of maintenance that make any
artifact tick again, I adopt a normative sense of reparation and maintenance: reparation
and maintenance refer to modifi cations of the artifacts that can be considered as techno-
logically and economically feasible given the relevant technological state of the art and
given the available resources. Changing the starter of a car and fi lling it up with petrol,
then, count typically as reparation or maintenance; transforming a “total-loss” wrecked
car into its original form does not.