MARK MOESpt. 2, chap. 3 of God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy: A Critical Study in the
Light of the Philosophy of Saint Thomas (New York: Longman’s, Green, 1938).
- The dictum of Richard of St. Victor is “ubi amor, ibi oculus.” Quoted in
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, 3.d.35.1.21. - For example, there is Socrates’ reference to “keen eyesight” at Republic
368c– d and his description at Phaedrus 247a of the soul’s journey at the edge of
the universe in terms suggestive of viewing a theatrical spectacle (qewriva can
mean being a spectator at the games or theater). Then there is his mention
of the descent from divine qewriva to that of human beings at Republic 517d,
and his mention of the contemplation (qewriva) of all time and existence at
Republic 486a (see also 500b– c). See Press, “Knowledge as Vision.” This under-
standing of knowledge as vision does not necessarily fall prey to Heidegger’s
objection that it is bound up with the “metaphysics of presence.” For the soul
in Phaedrus 247 is moving around the rim of the inner universe, and seeing the
Forms therefore from different “angles” and “distances.” This soul will have to
synthesize its apprehensions, retentions, and protentions of the Forms, and this
will be an endless task. - See note 16 above.
- John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Garden
City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1955), 251. See all of chaps. 8 and 9. On p. 268 New-
man quotes Aristotle’s mention of an “eye of experience” in a discussion of
frovnhsi~ at Nichomachean Ethics, bk. 6, chap. 11 (1143b13). - Xenophon’s brief depiction of a conversation between Socrates and
Glaucon indicates that Glaucon was as a youth highly ambitious and quite ig-
norant. See Xenophon, “Memoirs of Socrates,” 3.6 in Xenophon, Conversations
of Socrates (London: Penguin, 1990), 152– 56. See also Nalin Ranasinghe, The
Soul of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 2– 3, 4– 6, 15– 16. On
Ranasinghe’s reading, Glaucon believes that injustice is natural and that he, a
member of the natural aristocracy, is born to rule. He is driven by a fi erce ambi-
tion to wield power, and thinks one must reform fi rst the city and only then the
soul. Socrates thinks that a desire to rule others is indicative of a disordered
soul that does not know itself, and is trying to make Glaucon aware of the ab-
surdity of his political ambitions without publicly shaming him. - Perhaps the Laws may be read as a depiction of the Athenian Stranger’s
prescribing a gymnastic regimen for a particular povli~, intended to maintain it
in hea lt h once it is founded. (T here is a poem by t he g reat Att ic leg islator S olon,
the kinsman of Plato’s maternal great-great grandfather, in which Solon speaks
of the povli~ as an organism susceptible to disease, whose health is maintained
by following a regimen contained in a good code of laws.) But it does not go
without saying that Plato endorses the regimen in every respect. See note 39. - See note 14. Socrates hides, so to speak, his deepest communicative
intentions beneath the surface of the conversation. Mark Gifford has a good
discussion of the difference between the dramatic irony “internal” to a Platonic
dialogue and “external” dramatic irony that refers to a character’s behavior
outside a dialogue but known to Plato’s audience. See Mark Gifford, “Dramatic
Dialectic in Republic Book 1,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20 (2001):