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INTRODUCTIONheroes.) The philosophical equivalent of a superhero might be someone
knowledgeable, virtuous, compassionate, able to dispense ad hoc sage-
like advice, and someone willing and able to teach would-be students of
philosophy. But is such a character to be found in Plato’s dialogues?
By defi nition, all writers of sokratikoi logoi feature a character named
“Socrates” who may or may not refl ect well or accurately the historical
Socrates, and the three extant examples of this once-popular genre—
those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes—vary considerably. As far
as one can tell, Plato’s Socrates is far and away the most complex, para-
doxical, unclassifi able, and ironic character in these dialogues. If this
character izat ion of Socrates were even part ially cor rect, t hen how would
saying that Socrates represents Plato’s views of philosophy or of the phi-
losopher help us to identify and understand Plato’s deeply held views?
Let us consider briefl y whether Plato’s Socrates is really capable
of carrying the mantle of the philosophical superhero, with whom ev-
ery reader would identify the author himself. If one focuses solely on
Socrates’ missionary role in many (though not all) dialogues and on his
stature as a martyr (both erotic and religious) who dies for his beloved
pursuit of wisdom—condemned to this fate by many men whom he had
questioned and found wanting—a reader new to Plato might then be led
to conclude that Socrates is precisely such a superhero, albeit a tragic
one. Yet if we consider the complex portrait of Socrates that Plato draws,
one might note vital aspects of Socrates’ character that would seem to
make him unfi t for, or at least miscast in, the role of superhero. I would
note fi ve such features:
- Throughout the dialogues, Socrates insists that he does not have
knowledge of the most important things (some of which are things he
thinks people in certain positions need to, and should, know). If the
conditions for knowledge are made strict enough, then we must regard
him as entirely sincere in his general disclaimers of knowledge and
his insistence that his “small” human wisdom is worth little or nothing
(Apology 22e– 23b). - Socrates’ ironic stance keeps him at arm’s length from others
and makes it impossible in some cases to know exactly what he is saying
or meaning. This ironical “shield” (as D. C. Muecke calls it) appears
hubristic to others, such as Alcibiades and Agathon in the Symposium,
or entirely pseudos, as with Thrasymachus in the Republic and Callicles
in the Gorgias, or seemingly impenetrable, as in the case of Socrates’
response to Alcibiades’ offer of sexual favors (Symposium 218e– 219a). I
agree with Alexander Nehamas that irony, at its most complex level,
is not simply a way of speaking, but is rather a mode of being. Plato’s
Socrates doesn’t just “use” irony; he is an ironist.^9 And as Nehamas has