OF PSYCHIC MAIEUTICS AND DIALOGICAL BONDAGE IN PLATO’S
THEAETETUSnot the substitution of one method or account of method for another; it
is the articulation of the conditions in virtue of which philosophical in-
quiry can be pursued in conversation. Socrates does not account for the
critical capacity he claims for himself—he does not even describe the
process of testing as such—but rather describes the experiences of vari-
ous patients he has encountered. Of those who submit to Socrates’ art of
psychic maieutics, those who follow through with their treatment, and
whom the god allows, make wonderful progress, fi nding within them-
selves and giving birth to many beautiful things (150d3– 8). Although
S o c r a t e s c l a i m s t h a t h i s p a t i e nt s l e a r n not h i n g f r o m h i m , he ne v e r t hel e s s
says that he and the god are the cause (aition; 150e1) of this fi nding and
giving birth. Those who leave Socrates’ care too soon miscarry, confuse
falsehoods and images with the truth, and end up appearing ignorant
both to others and to themselves (150e1– 8). Of those who leave Socrates’
care prematurely, some want to come back. Of those who seek to resume
their treatment, some are allowed to return—though they seem to be
few in number. The implication is clear: in order to see your pregnancy
through, you must submit to Socrates’ art of psychic maieutics. This is
the fi rst strand of the dialogical bond: Theaetetus is bound to Socrates.
The second strand is twofold: Theaetetus is bound to the task of
seeing his psychic offspring brought to light, and he is bound to the task
of saying what knowledge itself is. These two do not coincide insofar as
the attempt to say what knowledge itself is, as a matter of inquiry, neither
begins nor ends with Theaetetus. Socrates warns Theaetetus that these
two bonds confl ict with one another. If Theaetetus’ offspring turns out
to be false, he must be willing to sever the “maternal” bond for the sake
of pursuing the investigation of knowledge (151c2– d3).^31
The third strand is complex as well. Theaetetus is bound to him-
self, but in different respects. In the fi rst place, he is made responsible
for his share of the conversation. Further, insofar as Theaetetus must be
willing to give up his offspring, he appears to be bound to himself more
than to anything he might bring forth. The question is whether The-
aetetus is to be bound more strongly to himself or to the inquiry. One
implication of Socrates’ cautionary tale about those who leave prema-
turely seems to be that there is a danger in caring more for oneself than
for the inquiry in which one engages with Socrates. On the other hand,
however, it seems that Theaetetus is to share in Socrates’ professed care
for the boy, and, more signifi cantly, that Theaetetus is bound to him-
self in the sense of what he is to become. Theaetetus will emerge from
this experience wise, ignorant but aware of that ignorance, or ignorant
without self-knowledge. In light of Socrates’ remarks at the end of the
dialogue (210b11– d4), and Eucleides’ report of Socrates’ remarks about
Theaetetus’ promising future (142d1– 3), it seems that Theaetetus’ care