OF PSYCHIC MAIEUTICS AND DIALOGICAL BONDAGE IN PLATO’S
THEAETETUSabove, Socrates’ concern for Theaetetus and his interest in pursuing his
own self-knowledge need not be at odds with one another. And insofar
as Socrates gives more consideration to Theaetetus at crucial moments
in the conversation, it seems that in this case he does make good on the
promise of psychic maieutics. The more signifi cant point, I take it, is
that there is no way to guarantee this. Socrates’ practice of psychic ma-
ieutics can only be defended on the basis of what he actually does in this
conversation with Theaetetus. Socrates’ twin denials of being a teacher
and being responsible entail an ambiguity inherent in his character. On
his own terms, Socrates cannot say in advance how dialogical bondage
will play out in a given situation, that is, whether he will appear to be a
virtuous midwife, or guilty of malpractice.^38 If Socrates insists that he is
not responsible for his patients, he opens himself to the charge of being
a tyrant. If Socrates accepts responsibility, then he opens himself to the
charge of reneging on his obligations. This follows from the account of
psychic maieutics, as well as from the indication Socrates gives at the
end of the dialogue of what he might be able to provide his patients.
If Theaetetus conceives again, he will conceive better things in virtue
of what he has experienced with Socrates, and if he does not, at least
he will be less harsh with his associates, and not suppose that he knows
that which he does not. This much, and nothing more, Socrates’ art of
psychic maieutics can do (210b11– c5). Socrates has no exchange-value,
nor can he force his interlocutors to take him seriously. That is, it seems
that there is no way to say in advance whether Socrates will appear to be
a philosopher, a sophist, or a tyrant—or simply foolish.
***
In conclusion, I would like to bring the notion of dialogical bondage
more explicitly to bear on the issue of knowledge. In particular, it seems
that the notion of dialogical bondage reveals another sense in which
Socrates’ account of psychic maieutics makes possible the conversation
recounted in the Theaetetus. That account not only prevents the con-
versation from miscarrying, but also establishes the conditions for the
possibility of their having a dialogue at all insofar as it binds together
Socrates, Theaetetus, and their shared attempt to say what knowledge it-
self is. Throughout the dialogue, as a sort of undercurrent, runs an em-
phasis on the shared agreement or commitment necessary for the con-
versation to take place, and to continue. From the very beginning, when
Socrates urges Theaetetus to not “back out of what has been agreed
upon” (145c2– 3; trans. Benardete), to the end of the dialogue, when
Socrates asks, “Are we st ill pregnant and in labor” (210b4; my emphasis),
the standard to which Socrates appeals is what they are able to agree