OF PSYCHIC MAIEUTICS AND DIALOGICAL BONDAGE IN PLATO’S
THEAETETUSwhich they are opinions of, that is, no way to test them, then there is
no way to know that I am right. This has the striking consequence that
I also cannot ever be wrong—but this is just to say that knowledge is
impossible.
Thus Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus must come to an agree-
ment among themselves, such as they are. Dialogical bondage seems to
allow for an alternative to the two failed hypotheses explicitly treated in
the Theaetetus. It also allows for a dialectical or dialogical understanding
of measure. Recall Socrates’ interest in Theaetetus’ heritage. It is on the
basis of what he learns about Theaetetus through their conversation that
Socrates can serve as the measure of Theaetetus’ labor. The measure,
then, is neither simply in Theaetetus, nor simply in Socrates—both are
measured against their shared attempt to say what knowledge is, and it is
the determinacy that emerges from the dynamic of dialogical bondage
that allows Theaetetus’ offspring to be tested.^41 This does not, however,
do away with the contingency or vulnerability of that agreement. In fact,
it has the crucial consequence that Socrates will not be able to defi ne
himself or his practices in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of
confl icting appearances.
I have said that with the account of psychic maieutics Plato can
be seen to engage with a caricature of Socrates. That caricature allows
for a critical engagement with Socrates’ practice of philosophy (and
philosophical practice more generally). Plato thus sets in motion two
distinct—though not unrelated—series of questions. On the one hand,
insofar as Socrates, psychic maieute, must assume the status of the mea-
sure of the soul and its conceptions, that caricature lays the ground for
the basic question underlying the ensuing conversation: How can we
attain and account for measured knowledge? It seems that the maieutic
relationship, understood in terms of what I have called dialogical bond-
age, provides an alternative to the assumption that the measure must lie
either in the knower or in the known. But insofar as it follows from this
that knowledge is a matter of a reciprocal relationship of measuring and
being measured among those who participate in dialogue, this means
knowledge is not something to be attained once and for all.
On the other hand, insofar as Socrates is so easily recognized in
that caricature, it begins to make clear how easily the Athenians could
recognize Socrates in the charges brought against him. Indeed, insofar
as one of the consequences of the Theaetetus is that Socrates cannot de-
fi ne himself or his practices in advance so as to distinguish himself from
that public image, it becomes unclear how Socrates could account for
himself so as to refute the charges brought against him. The distinction
between Socrates as one who cares for the youth of the city and Socrates