Philosophy in Dialogue : Plato's Many Devices

(Barré) #1
OF PSYCHIC MAIEUTICS AND DIALOGICAL BONDAGE IN PLATO’S
THEAETETUS

corpus. Of those, only two do not occur in the Theaetetus, and neither of those
(Cratylus 421a5 and Statesman 268b1) is concerned with Socrates’ practice of
philosophy. In addition, all but six of the twenty-four occurrences of the lan-
guage of midwifery in the Theaetetus are found in the three Stephanus pages
comprising Socrates’ initial account of his art of psychic maieutics. See also
Leonard Brandwood, A Word Index to Plato (Leeds: W. S. Maney, 1976).



  1. Hemmenway, “Philosophical Apology,” 326.

  2. Apology 18b7– c1.

  3. In light of Socrates’ remarks in the Apology (for example, 31d– 32a, 37b)
    about the impossibility of teaching a multitude in a short time, and of a mul-
    titude as such becoming philosophic—though not only in that light—there is
    something a little odd about thinking that a philosophical account of knowl-
    edge would really be much help in the courtroom.

  4. Theaetetus 14 4 d8 – e1.

  5. Theaetetus 164e2– 165a3. Theodorus (who at 145b10– c2 is said not to be
    the sort of man to joke around) refuses to take responsibility for Protagoras’
    orphaned logos, saying that Callias the son of Hipponicus has already been ap-
    pointed guardian of Protagoras’ children. See also Phaedrus 275e4– 6.

  6. The issue of the knowledge implied or assumed by Socrates’ account of
    psychic maieutics will be dealt with in more detail below.

  7. Apology 20e6– 21a9. The hesitation with which Socrates says that he un-
    dertook his examination of the oracle’s pronouncement seems to be echoed by
    the language of force and necessity in Socrates’ account of psychic maieutics,
    for example, 150c7– 8: “The god compels me to practice maieutics” (maieuesthai
    me ho theos anankazei).

  8. This phrase in particular, ou panu ti sophos, has been at the center of the
    interpretive debate surrounding Socrates’ denials of being wise and the knowl-
    edge his art of psychic maieutics must presuppose. For a summary of the debate
    about how to translate the phrase, see Sedley, “Three Platonist Interpretations,”
    esp. 98– 101. The basic question is whether to take this as meaning that Socrates
    is “not at all” wise, or (as Sedley, following the anonymous commentary, renders
    it) “not completely” wise. The qualifi ed sense of the latter—which Sedley argues
    is more grammatically accurate—allows both for the human wisdom Socrates
    claims for himself in the Apology and for an interpretation of the Theaetetus that
    does not have to conclude that Socrates’ account of psychic maieutics is simply
    contradictory or paradoxical.

  9. For example, Wengert, “Paradox of the Midwife,” argues that Socrates’
    account leads to an unresolvable paradox. Benardete, “On the Way of the
    Logos,” argues that Socrates does identify himself with the god in this pas-
    sage, and that “there is nothing to” Socrates’ art of psychic maieutics (28). The
    anonymous commentator is perhaps the most sympathetic reader of psychic
    maieutics, although insofar as he takes the Theaetetus as a whole to be a maieutic
    argument for the model of knowledge he fi nds in the Meno, he limits his ability
    to reckon with the Theaetetus on its own terms.

  10. For more on the knowledge evidently presupposed in Socrates’ ac-
    count, see Sedley, Midwife of Platonism, 33– 35. No less problematically, Socrates

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