MARTHA KENDAL WOODRUFFmerating, distinguishing, and of course repeating its aspects, and their
awareness of their own language—indicating their self-consciousness,
or better, Plato’s, about method.
In the Philebus, the language of reconciliation through repetition
explicitly calls attention to itself. Socrates says outright: “It is through
discourse [uJpo; lovgwn] that the same thing fl its around, becoming one
and many in all sorts of ways” (15d4– 5). This concise statement high-
lights what is both bewildering and awe-inspiring about language—its
“‘immortal and ageless’ condition” (15d8).^32 In language, the tension
between the one and the many works itself out on several levels; just as
names can both separate and unify things, language too can multiply it-
self (more and more words, defi nitions, distinctions) while still remain-
ing itself a unity (one grammar, one dialogue). This oneness branching
out into the many has ontological as well as linguistic signifi cance, since
for the Greeks lovgo~ encompasses both speech and thought.
As in the Parmenides, youth and age play a role in thought and
speech. Socrates says of this one/many feature of language: “Whoever
among the young fi rst gets a taste of it is as pleased as if he had found
a treasure of wisdom. He is quite beside himself with pleasure,” which
eventually leads to confusion (15e). This remark connects thought with
the pleasure of the immature delight in mental gymnastics. Socrates
has to steer the dialogue clear of “childish” proofs (13d6) and “common-
place puzzles” that are “no longer even worth touching” (14d5– 7). Pro-
tarchus, faced with these affronts, at fi rst reacts defensively by remind-
ing Socrates “we are all young”; he then seeks to “remove this kind of
disturbance from our discussion in a peaceful way” (16a5– b). But Pro -
tarchus must suffer many more rebuffs and upsets in order to learn and
to mature; he learns through a positive repetition. At fi rst, Protarchus
objects to Socrates’ way of “plunging us into diffi culties and repeating
questions” (20a). Yet later, Protarchus welcomes Socrates’ suggestion to
review categories “one by one, for memory’s sake” (27b– c) and he asks
for yet another reminder (31c– d).^33 By the end, Protarchus accuses plea-
sures of resembling “children who don’t possess the least bit of reason”
(65c6). Dialectical revision proves crucial to the maturing process.
The lovgo~ must follow a long, rough path of repeating and refi n-
ing questions to move toward the gradual reconciliation of the ques-
tioner and the questioned. Even Socrates has problems in his method of
searching for truth. He remains devoted to the fi nest method (kallivwn
oJdo;~), although “it has often escaped me and left me behind, alone, and
helpless [a[poron]” (16b5 – 7). It is easy to explain but hard to practice. A
theoretical explanation will not suffi ce; the problems of the one and the