PLATO’S DIFFERENT DEVICE
As Guthrie acknowledges, this untidiness may be a certain “lack of precision
which Plato himself singles out as the mark of real knowledge” (History of Greek
Philosophy, 238).
- As Guthrie writes, this dialogue “offers us not the slightest hint of a cul-
mination in any mysterious Form of the Good, transcending knowledge, truth
and even existence” (History of Greek Philosophy, 201). - As Gadamer puts it, “it is almost absurdly obtrusive to the modern
reader that the late Plato of the Parmenides seems every bit the equal of Aristotle
in criticizing the doctrine of the ideas” (Idea of the Good, 9). - For more on these questions, see Gadamer’s essays “Plato’s Unwritten
Teaching” and “Amicus Plato Magis Amica Veritas,” in Dialogue and Dialectic, as well
as the debate between Cynthia Hampton (Pleasure, Knowledge, and Being) and
Kenneth Sayre (Plato’s Late Ontology). For Aristotle’s reports of Platonic math-
ematics in relation to the Philebus, see Metaphysics, Alpha 6, trans. W. D. Ross, in
Plato: Complete Works. - Robert Dostal, “Gadamer’s Continuous Challenge: Heidegger’s Plato
Interpretation,” in The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Lewis Hahn (Chi-
cago: Open Court, 1997), 289– 307. - This essay has a long history (one topic, many revisions). It began as a
paper written for a graduate seminar with Sarah Waterlow Broadie, which was
then awarded the Cooper Prize in Greek Philosophy at Yale University in May - For stimulating ways of interpreting the Philebus overall, I acknowledge
the series of lectures given by Günter Figal at the Collegium Phaenomenologi-
cum, Citta di Castello, Italy, in July 2002. I also thank Walter Brogan for invit-
ing me to lead a seminar on this dialogue during the Collegium. Finally, I am
grateful to James E. Berg and Gary Alan Scott for recent careful readings and
helpful suggestions.