IN PLATO’S IMAGEof a philosopher or a lover of beauty, and all human souls glimpse what
they once knew by means of recollection (249b).
It is not easy for all souls to gain from earthly things a recollection
of those realities, either for those which had but a brief view of them
at that earlier time, or for those which, after falling to earth, were so
unfortunate as to be turned toward unrighteousness through some
evil communications and to have forgotten the holy sights they once
saw. Few then are left which retain an adequate recollection of them;
but these when they see here any likeness [oJmoivwma] of the things of
that other world, are stricken with amazement and can no longer con-
trol themselves; but they do not understand their condition, because
they do not clearly perceive. Now in the earthly copies of justice and
temperance and the other ideas which are precious to souls there is no
light, but only a few, approaching the images [oJmoiwvmasin] through
the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which
they imitate [tou` eijkasqevnto~], and these few do this with diffi culty.
(249e– 250b)^15The earthly likenesses are dim compared to the realities, but are dim re-
minders nonetheless. Human access to the realities comes from things
in this world that are images of the realities. What is needed is simply
the right use of the aids of recollection (249c). Furthermore, the phi-
losopher’s vision—a vision of objects of human experience that reveals
dim glimpses of reality, not direct vision of reality—will be diffi cult and
rare. In this manner the Phaedrus echoes elements of Phaedo in which we
learn that we gain understanding of things-in-themselves (for example,
the equal) from objects of our experience (for example, two sticks of
equal length).
The Sophist also treats images, and eventually points to their role
in philosophical discourse. The Eleatic Stranger and young Theaetetus,
in their complex and at times circuitous conversation, weave together
discussions of images (roughly 235b– 236d, 239c– d, 264c ff.) and the
possibility of not-being (roughly 237c, 239d– 264b). A formulation of
the ontological status of not-being emerges from their conversation, ex-
plaining how non-being helps render philosophical discourse possible,
and delineating the role of images as part of that discourse.
The Stranger and Theaetetus are confronted with the nature of
negation and falsehood and the puzzle of what-is-not. They are plagued
by the sophistic claim that falsehood is utterly impossible, since not-
being could neither be conceived nor uttered since it has no part of be-
ing and is therefore nothing (236e– 237a, 260c– d). The motivation for