Philosophy in Dialogue : Plato's Many Devices

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INTRODUCTION


Socratic Elenchi,” in Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s
Dialogues and Beyond, ed. Gary Alan Scott (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2002), 89– 100.



  1. For what is known about the characters in Plato’s dialogues, see Debra
    Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosography of Plato and Other Socratics (Indianapolis:
    Hackett, 2002).

  2. See the appendix for a chronology of the dramatic dates of Plato’s
    dialogues.

  3. John J. Mulhern showed in a 1971 paper that such an argument is re-
    quired, but one still fi nds t his sloppy turn of phra se in many work s on Plato. See
    John J. Mulhern, “Two Interpretive Fallacies,” Systematics 9 (1971): 168– 72. Lack-
    ing an argument which proves that a particular character is presenting Plato’s
    view, commentators could argue from the premise that Phaedrus or Pausanias
    in the Symposium, for example, are presenting Plato’s views of eros. This is just
    what Elizabeth V. Spelman does in her essay “Woman as Body,” which appears
    in the popular textbook Tw e nt y Q u e s t i o n s , 4th ed., edited by Lee Bowie, Emily
    Michaels, and Robert Solomon (New York: Harcourt, 2000), 209– 14.

  4. See chapter 3 in the present volume for illustrative examples.

  5. Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Refl ections from Plato to Fou-
    cault (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 26. This is the theme of
    the chapter “Socratic Irony: Character and Interlocutors.”

  6. Nehamas, Art of Living, 48. We should recall in this connection Kierke-
    gaard’s infamous suggestion that Socratic irony “can deceive a person into the
    truth.” Quoted by Nehamas, Art of Living, 52 without reference/citation.

  7. For an analysis of the merits of the arguments of Socrates’ interlocu-
    tors, see John Beversluis, Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of Socrates’ Interlocu-
    tors in Plato’s Early Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

  8. The Symposium depicts a Socrates who stays out all night drinking and
    talking with his friends before going back to his usual haunts in the city for a
    day of discussion. The Crito raises the issue of Socrates’ duty to his family and
    friends, but Socrates of course remains true to his principles. In the Phaedo, we
    see Socrates asking Crito to have some of his men take Xanthippe and their
    baby home, leaving Socrates to talk with his friends in his fi nal hours. And in
    the Apology, Socrates mentions his wife and three sons only to make the point
    that he is not going to go for the sympathy vote.

  9. See, for example, Statesman 277d; Timaeus 29b– d; Laws 641d, 732a– b,
    799c– e, and 859c; and the aporetic ending of the Parmenides.

  10. Don Adams and Mark McPherran have both made this point. See Don
    Adams, “Elenchos and Evidence,” Ancient Philosophy 18, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 287–

  11. Mark McPherran has developed this as the method of induction. See his
    “Elenctic Interpretation and the Delphic Oracle” in Scott, ed., Does Socrates Have
    a Method? 114 – 44.

  12. The sole exception to this statement is Socrates’ claim in the Symposium
    that the one thing he understands is the art of love (ta erotika). But insofar as
    eros, in Socrates’ view, is a desire for what we lack, his knowledge of eros comes

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