MARK MOESMedicine and Philosophy in the
Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Phaedo
Three of the most extensive and most potentially illuminating dis-
cussions of medicine in relation to Socratic practice are found in the
Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Phaedo. Consider fi rst Socrates’ comparison in
Phaedrus 259e– 274b between the practice of medicine and the skillful
use of truthful rhetoric. There Socrates redefi nes rhetoric to mean not
mere persuasion but rather leading souls (yucígwgiva) by means of dis-
courses, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions but
also in private (261a). He divides truthful uses of rhetoric into non-
dialectical and dialectical kinds. When at 268a he begins to examine
the limitations of non-dialectical rhetorical techniques, Socrates com-
pares the skill of the good rhetorician to that of the good doctor. He
says that a qualifi ed doctor not only possesses basic healing skills but
also knows on whom to exercise them, when to exercise them, and pre-
cisely how to apply them in this or that concrete case. Likewise, a good
rhetorician not only possesses skill in basic non-dialectical rhetorical
techniques but also in dialectical ones.^2
Socrates contends that the rhetorician must possess the latter
skills in order to be able to learn when and how to exercise this or that
rhetorical technique in the presence of a particular auditor or audience.
The method of rhetoric is similar to the method of medicine, according
to Socrates, in the following way:
In both cases there is a nature that we have to determine, the nature
of the body in medicine, and of the soul in rhetoric, if we mean to
be scientifi c and not content with mere empirical routine when we
apply medicine and diet to induce health and strength, or words and
rules of conduct to implant such convictions and virtues as we desire.
(270b3 – 9; trans. Hackforth)In succeeding passages Socrates insists that the soul must be stud-
ied as a whole, grounding this strategy on the authority of Hippocrates,
who insisted that the body be studied as a whole. The truthful rhetori-
cian, he urges, must use dialectic to determine what components the
soul has and what active and passive powers the components possess,
and also what kinds of discourse there are and what communicative
powers they possess.^3 The truthful rhetorician, Socrates says at 271b– c,
classifi es the types of discourse and the types of soul, and the various
ways in which souls are affected, suggesting the type of speech appro-