Martin Buber's Theopolitics

Between Pharaohs and Nomads | 141

tradiction embodied by Korach’s revolt is none other than the contradiction of
freedom itself, the primary theopolitical problem.
The urge to freedom stems from two sources: a negative source, seeking to
eliminate anything that is “over” the individual to unleash the individual’s will
without obstruction, and a positive source, seeking to eliminate illegitimate au-
thority to pursue some project. In the first case, the desire for freedom has a
dictatorial side; inasmuch as the mere existence of others, whose desires may not
match one’s own, constrains one’s will, one seeks to overcome others and impose
one’s will. In this instance, freedom for one thus excludes freedom for others.
In the second case, one’s desire for freedom comes together with a commitment
to freedom; one therefore attempts to discern how everyone in the community
might possess equal freedom. However, one can immediately see that equal free-
dom for everyone places a restriction on the freedom of each individual (“my
freedom to swing my fist ends where your nose begins”). This is a paradox, unless
one admits that the dictatorial nature of the first type of freedom means that it
is not really freedom at all, only a desire to remove obstacles from the path of the
will. This is the type of freedom that the dictator possesses, and from Buber’s
perspective this type of freedom usurps the prerogative of God:

The people who set rebellions of this kind under way are not merely endeavor-

ing to find a sanction for the satisfaction of repressed lusts, but are in all se-

riousness desirous of gaining power over the divine might; or more precisely,

of actualizing and giving legitimacy to the god-might which a person has in

himself, the “free” one, as against the one which is “bound” by the chief or

shaman, with all the taboos used to fetter it. This tendency can admittedly be

realized only by placing [others] in a state of non-freedom and exposure, such

as is in many cases far worse than any previous abuse ever was; but this is only,

as one might say, a secondary effect, which is regarded as being unworthy of

any consideration.^60

Indeed, God himself already set an example in this regard, restricting his own
freedom by cutting the covenant with Israel and making promises to them. Self-
restriction too is imitatio dei, if the people understand how to do it in order to
empower others.
In this context we find a highly sympathetic discussion of law.^61 According
to Buber, the history of antinomian movements, which are “developed” versions
of the kind of tribal schism represented by Korach, shows that these movements
always seek to set divine freedom (Gottesfreiheit, חירות-אלהים) against divine law
(Gottesgesetz, חוקת-אלהים). Antinomians argue that “the law as such displaces the
spirit and the freedom,” and thus come to the false conclusion that “that [the law]
ought to be replaced by them.” Isolated divine freedom alone, however, “abol-
ishes itself ” in paradoxical fashion: