Martin Buber's Theopolitics

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Palestinian Rain | 247


  1. Hattis, Bi-National Idea in Palestine, 56–57. The British turned down the application
    for official registration on the grounds that Brit Shalom’s collaborators in the effort, the Poalei
    Zion Smol (Left Workers of Zion) party, were suspected communists. Brit Shalom lacked the
    resources to pursue the union program alone.

  2. Musa Budeiri, The Palestine Communist Party, 1919–1948: Arab and Jew in the Struggle
    for Internationalism (Chicago: Haymarket, 2010); Lockman, Comrades and Enemies.

  3. Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins, 89.

  4. Ruppin to Kohn, May 30, 1928, in Kedar, “Brith Shalom,” 71.

  5. Buber, “Our Pseudo-Samsons,” LTP 132.

  6. Magnes, “Like All the Nations?” in The Zionist Idea, 443.

  7. Haim, Abandonment of Illusions, 13.

  8. Cited in Hattis, Bi-National Idea, 54.

  9. David Werner Senator, “Letter of Resignation to Dr. Weizmann,” in Buber, Magnes,
    Simon, Towards Union in Palestine, 54.

  10. Cited in Kedar, “Brith Shalom,” 74.

  11. Bergmann, like Buber himself, is not simply recalling the multiethnic coexistence he
    experienced in the Hapsburg Empire. He is envisioning the possibility of a “new” thing enter-
    ing the world, through the agency of Zionist theopolitics. Cf. Dimitry Shumsky, “Historiogra-
    phy, Nationalism and Dual Nationalism: Czech-German Jewry, Prague Zionists, and Sources
    of Hugo Bergmann’s Dual-National Approach,” Zion 69.1 (2004): 45–80 [Hebrew].

  12. LTP 15.

  13. Kedar, “Brith Shalom,” 60.

  14. Shimoni, Zionist Ideology, 375.

  15. The SMC was created in 1922 by the British to promote Muslim solidarity rather than
    Arab solidarity as a force in Palestinian politics (Christian Arabs had played a central role in
    the development of Arab nationalism and anti-Zionist activity in Palestine). Kimmerling and
    Migdal, The Palestinian People, 85.

  16. Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929
    (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 258.

  17. A Jewish Agency investigation in 1929 concluded that “in isolated cases,” some Jews
    “shamefully went beyond the limits of self-defense,” but specifics are lacking. Segev, One Pal-
    estine, Complete, 3 27.

  18. Mattar, Mufti of Jerusalem, 48; Morris, Righteous Victims, 116.

  19. On the Istiqlal, see Porath, The Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 126; Mattar, Mufti
    of Jerusalem, 66; Kimmerling and Migdal, The Palestinian People, 97, 110. On al-Qassam, see
    Abdullah Schleifer, “Izz al-Din al-Qassam: Preacher and Mujahid,” in Struggle and Survival in
    the Modern Middle East, ed. Edmund Burke III and David N. Yaghoubian (Berkeley: Univer-
    sity of California Press, 1993), 137–151.

  20. Morris, Righteous Victims, 114.

  21. Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881–1948 (New York: Ox-
    ford University Press, 1992), 186.

  22. These are characterized as “concessions,” but this is incorrect. With the exception of
    immigration restrictions in the late 1930s, Brit Shalom was not calling for concessions but for
    mainstream Zionism to adopt its policies.

  23. Shapira, Land and Power, 186.

  24. Kedar, “Brith Shalom,” 62.

  25. Ruppin to Dr. Victor Jacobson, December 3, 1931, in Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in
    Palestine, 58.

  26. Goren, Dissenter in Zion, 315.

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