The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness

Janet Levin Role Functionalism, it should be noted, comes in two versions: one that derives from our “common sense” theory of th ...

Materialism This response is available to Role Functionalists and other non-reductive physicalists such as those who maintain th ...

Janet Levin detail—and see no connection whatsoever between the two. The general idea behind Premise (2) is that such a radical ...

Materialism physical and functional information about our brains and bodies could not possibly provide knowledge of what it’s li ...

Janet Levin 6 Eliminativism To embrace Eliminativism about some category of things is to deny that those things exist. One of th ...

Materialism Rosenthal 1986; Gennaro 2004)? And which relations make mental states conscious states of particular types, e.g. exp ...

Janet Levin Nagel, T. (1974) “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83: 435–450. Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking A ...

Dualism is the view that our world contains two irreducible kinds of entities, the physical and the non-physical. Its main conte ...

William S. Robinson Substance Dualism claims that our minds are substances that are distinct from any physical substance. The us ...

Dualism attribute non-physical properties to physical bearers, i.e. things that also have physical properties, and thus do not n ...

William S. Robinson This objection arises from the very wide acceptance of the principle of Physical Causal Closure: (PCC) Every ...

Dualism suffer from “phantom limb,” a condition in which patients feel that they still possess a limb that has in fact been ampu ...

William S. Robinson Jones believes, or what Jones desires, hopes, fears, or knows. To generalize: When dealing with mental state ...

Dualism to construct them. A suitably restricted definition of “conceivability” must count these as not genuinely conceivable, d ...

William S. Robinson Another kind of conceivability argument aims to establish property dualism, and is often called the Zombie A ...

Dualism A fifth argument for (property) dualism is the Knowledge Argument. This argument was advanced by Frank Jackson in 1982, ...

William S. Robinson counterintuitive, and Jackson is no longer content to accept it. In a 1996 book (with David Braddon-Mitchell ...

Dualism Some physicalists resist this conclusion by pointing to water, which is in fact composed of H 2 O molecules even though ...

William S. Robinson strategies of approach, all the while doubting that any approach would be successful and chiding ourselves f ...

Dualism 5 This hope may be tempered by reflection on what kind of mind would survive in those who have suffered brain damage due ...