Consciousness is a real, natural biological phenomenon, produced by and realized in
higher-level neurophysiological processes going on inside the brain.
This thesis is the shared core of two closely related theories of consciousness, Biological Naturalism
(BN) and Biological Realism (BR). Biological Naturalism has been formulated and defended by
John Searle ever since the 1990s in numerous writings, especially in his seminal book The
Rediscovery of the Mind (1992). Biological Realism was put forward by the present author in
Revonsuo (2006) Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon.
Although the two biological approaches to consciousness share a lot of metaphysical ground,
there are also significant differences between them. Whereas BN is presented in the context of
the philosophy of mind, BR is put forward in the context of the modern empirical science of
consciousness as a proposal for a metaphysical basis for that science.
In this chapter I will first summarize the main principles of Biological Naturalism, followed
by a summary of Biological Realism. After that, I will analyze some of their similarities and dif-
ferences. In the final sections, I will contrast the biological approach represented by BN and BR
with another currently influential approach: information theories of consciousness, especially
the Information Integration Theory.
1 Biological Naturalism
In the study of consciousness, the role of philosophy is, according to Searle, to get us to the point
at which we can start to have systematic scientific knowledge about consciousness (Searle 1998).
But the history of the philosophical mind-body problem, with its traditional categories and
conflicts such as “dualism” vs “materialism,” is unhelpful in this endeavour, because it involves a
series of philosophical confusions. Consequently, the study of consciousness is an area of science
in which scientific progress is blocked by philosophical error, says Searle (1998).
Searle presents BN as an approach to consciousness that, to begin with, invites us to forget
about the history of the mind-body problem in philosophy. Instead, we should go back to square
one, to build an approach that respects all the facts about consciousness but avoids the traditional
philosophical categories. Thereby we will have avoided also the typical philosophical confusions
and pitfalls about consciousness that the traditional philosophy of mind suffers from.
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BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM
AND BIOLOGICAL REALISM
Antti Revonsuo
Antti Revonsuo Biological Naturalism and Biological Realism