Andrew Peterson and Tim Baynepatients will not be able to communicate with those around them (at least not without the aid
of neuroimaging), they are likely to be aware of the presence of friends and family members, and
they may understand at least some of what is said to them (Graham 2017). Such a life affords
some possibilities for meaningful social interaction, albeit in forms that are highly restricted in
scope. It is far from obvious to us that such a life is not a life worth living, although we would
be the first to admit that this question deserves further attention.
9 ConclusionThis chapter has provided an overview of the state-of-the-art neuroimaging and EEG meth-
ods used to detect covert consciousness in post-comatose patients. We have outlined several
philosophical controversies surrounding this research, and have sketched preliminary responses
to a number of these issues. Although post-comatose disorders of consciousness concern only
a relatively narrow subset of brain-injured patients, the scientific study of these patients and
related philosophical reflection on the implications of such research promises to benefit not only
brain-injured patients but will also contribute to our understanding of the nature of conscious-
ness itself.^2
Notes1 Note that although the print version of Klein’s paper appeared only in 2017, it was published online in
2015, and prior to the publication of Fernández-Espejo et al. (2015).
2 We are grateful to Neil Levy for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. We also gratefully acknowl-
edge the support of an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship to Bayne (FT150100266).
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