Amy Kind10 For issues relevant to the first question, see Janet Levin’s discussion in Chapter 3 of this volume. See also
Chalmers (2014: 103–07).
11 For a recent fictionalized depiction of NDEs that raises interesting philosophical questions, see the
Netflix series The OA.
12 For another source arguing in favor of NDEs, see van Lommel (2010).
13 Arguments against NDEs are presented in Mitchell-Yellin and Fischer (2014) and Augustine (2015).
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