To make sure that this appearance is not deceptive, we need to think about how the
ontological pluralist should formulate the truth-maker principle. The standard
formulation of this principle is as follows:
(TM): For allP,ifPis true, then 9 x(x makes Ptrue.)There is an intramural dispute among truth-maker theorists about what sort of
relation themakes-truerelation is. I hold that, at the very least, ifxmakesPtrue,
then there is no world in whichxexists andPis not true.^35 But this is all I will say
about the makes-true relation here.^36
Focus on the existential quantifier that appears in TM. Recall that the ontological
pluralist believes that there is more than one fundamental quantifier. An implicit
assumption in the formulation of TM is that there is exactly one fundamental
quantifier. If we embrace PEP, we drop that assumption. PEP is a version of
ontological pluralism that accepts two fundamental quantifiers,“ (^9) p”and“ (^9) c.”
A PEP-friendly version of TM is the following:
(PEP-TM): For allP,ifPis true, then either (^9) px(xmakesPtrue) or (^9) cx(xmakes
Ptrue.)
The thought behind PEP-TM is this. If you accept that there is a close connection
between existence and quantification, you will be attracted to Quine’s slogan that to
be is to be the value of a bound variable.^37 And if you also think that there are
fundamentally different ways to exist, you will hold that there are different funda-
mental quantifiers. You should then hold that to be in some fundamental way is to be
within the scope of a fundamental quantifier. The truth-maker principle says that
whenever something is true, some existent makes it true. The generalized truth-
maker principle says that whenever something is true, something existing in some
way or other makes it true.^38
PEP-TM is the proper way to formulate the truth-maker principle given PEP. PEP
is consistent with PEP-TM. Since the fact that World War I is horrific is within the
range of“ (^9) p,”it is the case that (^9) px(xmakes it true that World War I is horrific). And
(^35) D. H. Mellor (2003: 213–14) holds that this claim is too strong; D. M. Armstrong (2004: 10–12)
suggests that truth-makers must not only necessitate their truths, they must 36 relevantlynecessitate them.
A principle weaker than TM is sometimes appealed to, specifically, thattruth supervenes on being.Onthis
principle,truthsare trueinvirtue of existing objectshavingproperties or standing invariousrelations,but there
needn’tbeanentitythatis“an object having a property or some objects standing in a relation,”and hence there
need not be anything whose existence is modally sufficient for the truth of contingent propositions. (David
Lewis (2001) defends a version of this view.) I believe that all of the points I want to make about presentism,
PEP, and the truth-making objection could be made by way of appeal to this weaker principle. 37
38 See Cocchiarella (1969: 42) for discussion.
In stating the truth-maker principle, I quantified over propositions. Which quantifier was employed?
The view that I prefer holds thatabstractado not exist in the same way asconcreta; to use the older
terminology, abstractasubsistrather thanexist. So I am inclined to hold that there is at least a third
fundamental quantifier in play here. But I needn’t defend this here. Another plausible view is that abstract
objects presently exist, and so are within the domain of“ (^9) c.”