us by way of ordinary sense perception are presented to us as being present (and as
being actual).^64 But sense perception is not the only way in which objects are
represented in conscious states. Memory or recollection is another faculty by which
objects are represented, but memory does not represent objects as being present.
Rather, all objects presented by memory are presented as being past.^65 They might
not all be presented as beingmerelypast, but many certainly are, as when I recollect
past facts about my childhood. It is a leitmotif of the phenomenological tradition that
different kinds of intentional states represent different kinds of objects along with
their characteristic modes of being. Looking for a distinction between how modes of
being are presentedwithina particular kind of intentional state, such as ordinary
sense perception, was never a serious project.
On the phenomenological response, I believe that I am present and that other
things are present simply by having present perceptions of my surroundings and
myself : things seem to me to be present (rather than past) and unless I have reasons
to distrust how things seem, I form beliefs more or less automatically that things are
how they seem. The widespread belief that things are present is explained simply by
noting that I am in no way unique in this respect. These perceptions also provide the
basis for my knowledge that I and other things are present. That sense perception
presents things as being present while memory presents things as being past explains
not merely why we recognize an ontological distinction between present and past but
also why we have such facility with that distinction.
Ifind the phenomenological response tempting. But let’s see what our other
options are rather than keep all our eggs in one basket. As we’ll see, the phenom-
enological response is consistent with the remaining responses. In fact, in different
ways the remaining responses are arguably strengthened when coupled with the
phenomenological response.
According to the easy knowledge response, there are certain propositions—call
them“easy propositions”that are incredibly easy to know. Roughly, ifPis an easy
proposition for a subjectS, all that is required forSto knowPis forPto be true, forS
to believeP, and forSto have no evidence for a proposition thatSknows is
inconsistent withP. Easy propositions are in a sense a priori propositions in that
they do not demand positive sensory evidence for their truth, but this is because they
do not demand any positive evidence for their truth, but merely no known evidence
against their truth. On the easy knowledge response, it does not matter whether my
past counterpart has the same evidence for his being present as I have for my being
present, since the possession or lack of positive evidence for presentness is irrelevant.
(^64) Compare with Paul (2010b) and Cameron (2015: 35–6), both of whom grant that perception presents
things as of being present, that is, as present. (I allow that a perception can present x asFwhenxis notF;Idonot
use“present as”as a success verb.) Paul (2010b) attempts to provide an explanation of why perception presents
objects as of present that is of use to the reductionist who de 65 nies that being present is a special metaphysical status.
See, for example, Husserl (1991: 61), among many other places. For a nice piece on Husserl on
memory, see Brough (1975).