Incidentally, that there is a close connection between categories and modes of
being has been defended by philosophers outside of the Western tradition.
Gajendragadkar (1988) is an interesting study of the ancient Indian philosopher
Kanāda, and in this book he defends the view that for Kanāda thePadārthas, which
Gajendragradkar translates as“categories,”are modes of being. Gajendragadkar
(1988: liii) tells us that each category is a distinct mode of existence with distinct
logical behavior, that Kanāda’s doctrine of categories runs parallel to Aristotle’s
(Gajendragadkar 1988: 1), that, like Aristotle, Kanāda distinguishes different senses
of being (Gajendragadkar 1988: 5), and that modes of being cannot be thought of as
classes and category-words do not denote classes of things (Gajendragadkar 1988: 11).
However, unlike Aristotle, Kanāda denies that any one of the categories is metaphys-
ically prior to the others (Gajendragadkar 1988: 156–7).
On the theory defended here, there is a connection between ontological categories
and potential senses of“being”: although in ordinary English,“being”might be
univocal, there are as many possibleperfectly naturalmeanings for“being”as there
are ontological categories. These senses of“being”arepotentialsenses twice over:
they are available to be meant, and, on some views of meaning, theystrive to be
meant.^35 These potential senses of“being”correspond to the modes of being.
However, no other contemporary view of ontological categories implies that there
is even an interesting connection between the plurality of ontological categories and
the (potential, natural) senses of“being.”^36 For example, if ontological categories
simply are highly natural classes, properties, or kinds of things, the connection
between them and potential senses of“being”is tenuous at best.^37 Perhaps contem-
porary metaphysicians will take this fact to reflect favorably on their view. It does
indicate that their use of“ontological category”has abandoned the tradition that gave
birth to the expression.
The view defended here respects the intuition that the fact that an object belongs to
a particular ontological category is a deeper fact than any fact concerning the
properties had by that object. The category that an object belongs to is not just
another property among many had by the object, but rather is ontologically prior to
in section 7.5. Hintikka (1986: 100–1) indicates sympathy with linking categories to different existential
senses of“being.”Hoffman (2012: 142) also links categories with senses of“existence”in Aristotle. Kahn
(1986: 14) sounds a cautionary note. See Pini (2005: 70–3) for a discussion of medieval doctrines on
categories and modes of being.
(^35) This admittedly Leibnizian remark is not hyperbole given the view that the naturalness of a meaning-
candidate is a factor that determines whether that candidate succeeds in being meant. See Sider (2009) for
discussion, as well as Lewis (1984) and Merrill (1980) for inspiration for the view. 36
Von Solodkoff and Woodward (2013: 560, fn. 3) also suggest a link between having a way of being
and belonging to an ontological category. Russell (1971: 268) does not talk in terms of categories, but does
say that there are two senses of“there is,”one that applies to non-sets such as chairs and another that
applies to sets. 37
We could reconcile their views and my own by holding that a kind is general in the relevant sense just
in case it corresponds with a way of being. Thanks to Joshua Spencer for discussion here.