Second, the existence and qualitative nature of almost nothings is completely deter-
mined by the existence and qualitative nature of positive entities.^5 But, on this model,
this fact is surprising. For, on this model, almost nothings enjoy a fundamental mode of
being that they share with positive entities. There is a fundamental way in which almost
nothings exist. Consider two other views that are structurally similar to the model
discussed here: minimal Meinongian presentism and full-on Meinongianism. These
views distinguish a fundamental inner quantifier and a fundamental outer quantifier.
The outer domain of minimal Meinongian presentism contains merely past
objects as well as presently existing ones, whereas its inner domain contains only
present objects. But since past objects do enjoy a fundamental mode of existence, it is
unsurprising that their existence and nature needn’t be exhausted by the existence
and nature of presently existing objects: they have an existence in their own right.
And this is why fundamental facts about the past needn’t supervene merely on
fundamental facts about the present. If past objects did not enjoy a fundamental
mode of being, their existence and nature would be determined by that which does
enjoy a fundamental mode.
Similarly for less minimal Meinongianism. Meinongians recognize an outer domain
of objects whose nature—orSosein, to use the popular technical expression—is not
across the board constrained by the existence and nature of those items in the inner
domain. They think that the truths about objects in general canfloat free of the truths
about existing objects.^6 Now Meinongians might try to avoid saying that the outer-
quantifier corresponds to a manner of being, but, as discussed in section 1.5.2, I think
that they are mistaken to do so. Objectsarein some fundamental way, and that is why
it is unsurprising that their natures are not completely exhausted by the natures of the
existent. If this weren’t the case, one would expect that, even if there are (in some sense)
non-existent objects, nonetheless all the facts about them are determined by facts about
the existing ones.
This is why I think this model makes surprising the fact that the existence and
nature of almost nothings isfixed by the existence and nature of positive entities. This
is not a decisive reason to reject the model, but it is a cost of it, and it should motivate
us to look carefully at the alternatives to it.
5.3 Almost Nothings and Being-In
In section 2.4.2, we discussed a mode of being calledbeing-in. This is the mode of
being enjoyed by attributes. Perhaps it is also the mode of being of other entities that
(^5) That facts about holes arefixed by facts about material objects is granted by Casati and Varzi (2004)
and Lewis and Lewis (1996). According to Weidemann (2002: 85–7), Aquinas would accept this principle,
as it follows from a more general principle that beings in the sense of being true supervene on genuine
beings; we will discuss what 6 “beings in the sense of being true”means in section 5.4.
Von Solodkoff and Woodward (2013) argue for this interpretation of Meinongianism.