Before we move on, one last disturbing possibility should be at least mentioned.
This is the possibility that, in a sense, there might bemoreto reality than what is
ranged over by the absolutely unrestricted quantifier. Just as we can make sense of the
claims of the formthere are Fs but there really aren’tFs, we can make sense of the
claimthere are no Fs but there really are Fs. The key is to explain what“really”is
doing in these sentences. In section 5.4, we briefly discussed the possibility of“super”
meanings for“ 9 .”Letm(“ (^9) s”)bea“super”meaning for“ 9 ,”and let“ (^9) s”be a
primitive quantifier with that meaning.m(“ (^9) s”)isa“super”meaning in the sense
that, for someΦ,“ (^9) sxΦ&~ 9 xΦ”expresses a truth. Suppose that“ 9 ”is not a
perfectly natural expression, but not because some semantically primitive restricted
quantifier is more fundamental, but rather because the most natural meaning for“ 9 ”
ism(“ (^9) s”). Relative to“ (^9) s,”“ 9 ”is arestrictedquantifier. Sincem(“ (^9) s”) is more natural
thanm(“ 9 ”), somehowm(“ (^9) s”) mustfit with use much less thanm(“ 9 ”). I do not
believe this possibility obtains, but I have no proof that there is no such meaning as
m(“ (^9) s”).^56 If there is, then there is a sense in which there aremoreentities than those
ranged over by our most unrestricted quantifier.^57
5.6 Easy Ontology?
Does recognizing being-by-courtesy have implications for whether certain onto-
logical disputes over the existence of Fs are“easy”in the sense of being easy to settle
in favor of the Fs?
Certainly not for all ontological disputes. To take an extreme example, consider
the dispute about whether there is a God. It is built into the very concept of God that
nothing could be both a God and a mere being by courtesy. There is a God only if
therereallyis a God in the peculiarly metaphysical sense of“really.”
However, this is not the case for other putative kinds of entity. It is, I think, built
into the concept ofsubstancethat substances are not beings by courtesy. But it is not
built into the concept oftable,chair, or evenperson, that these entities are substances.
It is not part of the concept of number that numbers have a certain ontological status;
nor is it a part of the concept of proposition, or set, or property. Each of these entities
might turn out to be mere beings by courtesy. The most compelling arguments for
these entities are based on the idea that we cannot avoid quantifying over them, but
these arguments do not by themselves also license the claim that the kind of
differs from that of negations and that of states of affairs, even though all of these entities are beings of
reason, and all of them have their foundations in real things.
(^56) Peter Finocchiaro has suggested to me that a certain kind of compositional universalist who also
holds that“the folk”speak truly but not restrictedly when they deny there are fusions of trout and turkeys
should 57 find this view attractive.
I cannot tell whether these observations should be comforting to those who reject the possibility of
unrestricted quantification because of the set-theoretical paradoxes. On the puzzles and perplexities
concerning unrestricted quantification, see the papers in Rayo and Uzquiano (2007).