in ordinary language, but my explanation of why certain ontological questions might
be“easy”in no way commits me to claims of this sort about ordinary language.
As noted above, there are important differences between the view I like and the
views of Schaffer, Thomasson, and Hofweber. But the important similarities should
also be stressed. We each believe in readings of“there are numbers”or“some holes
are in the cheese”that are straight-up literally true, rather than merely metaphoric-
ally true, merely true only given some pretense, or merely true-in-a-fiction.^65
Proponents of such views are motivated by ontological qualms, and perhaps they
are right to have such qualms. In the case of almost nothings, qualms are appropriate
to be sure! However, such views arenotjustified by these qualms since there are
alternatives that better accommodate the qualms without sacrificing the literal truth
of what is said in ordinary contexts.
5.7 Metaphysical Reflections on Being-by-Courtesy
In this section, I will briefly discuss some intriguing questions raised by the possibility
of beings by courtesy.
First, the main goal of this chapter was to provide a theory that accounts for the
intuition that holes and other absences are in some sense real but less real than their
hosts. In order to do so, I articulated a distinction between what I call“genuine
beings”and“beings by courtesy,”and argued that the theory that almost nothings are
beings by courtesy satisfies this intuition. But I didn’t articulate general principles
about when some entity is a mere being by courtesy. We will now consider principles
of this sort.
Facts about holes and other almost nothings supervene on facts about“positive”
entities.^66 Holes and other almost nothings are mereologically distinct from their
hosts. What is suggested by these observations is that in general facts about beings by
courtesy supervene on facts about genuine beings. Suppose we learn that thexs are
mereologically distinct from theys but asymmetrically supervene on theys. Should
we conclude that thexs are mere beings by courtesy?
One is reminded of Armstrong’s (1982) dictum that that which supervenes is no
addition to being.^67 But we must be careful. Suppose there is an omnipotent God
such that all else supervenes on the divine will. Is God then the only genuine being?
Worse, facts about mathematical and logical entities supervene on facts about
concreta, since mathematics and logic are realms of necessary truth. Do mathematica
(^65) Pace Yablo (2005).
(^66) There is one possible exception to this claim. If“global absences”are possible—that is, absences that
are the absence of anything positive—then in worlds in which they exist there are no positive entities on
which they supervene. But they might still be said to supervene in an indirect way on positive entities, since
if they were to exist, the global absences would not. See McDaniel (2013b) for a discussion of global
absences and ontological pluralism. 67
This dictum will receive critical scrutiny in section 7.3.