form a merely superficial superstructure of beings by courtesy?^68 Perhaps a stronger
relation than asymmetric supervenience, such as the grounding relations appealed to
by Fine (2001) and Schaffer (2009) or thein virtue ofrelation, would be more
appropriate to consider.^69
Suppose that we cannot paraphrase statements about holes and other almost
nothings in terms of statements about“positive”entities alone. Perhaps this is
because of the limits of our language: there are no infinitely long sentences in English,
and the only way to paraphrase talk about holes would be via infinitely long
constructions. However, suppose we can conceive of how such a paraphrase might
go in an augmented version of English. I think this is the case with holes: with
sufficient expressive resources—ones that go far beyond any language we could speak
or think—“explicit paraphrases”of talk of holes could be systematically given. If we
think this augmented version of English would be a metaphysically better language to
speak than ours, even though no quantifier in that language ranged over holes, then
we have a reason to think that holes are mere beings by courtesy. Ontological
reduction, on this picture, amounts to identifying some entity as a mere being by
courtesy. Ontologicalelimination, by contrast, consists in denying any sort of reality
to the entity in question.^70 Except in very rare cases, such as those in which the
positing of any kind of reality to a putative entity would suffice for paradox, it is more
warranted to seek an ontological reduction of an entity rather than an ontological
elimination.
Once we take seriously thatbeingmight not be perfectly natural, we need to
re-examine other metaphysical notions. Can beings by courtesy exemplify perfectly
natural properties or stand in perfectly natural relations? A negative answer to this
question is the contemporary analogue of Suárez’s (2005: 65–6) claim that“common
concepts”cannot apply to both beings of reason and real beings. It is also similar to a
view endorsed by Ratnakīrti, according to which (1) there is a distinction between
real and less than fully real attributes, (2) there is a distinction between real and non-
real entities, and (3) non-real entities cannot exemplify real attributes.^71
Holes (and other almost nothings) have proper parts and can stand in spatial,
temporal, and causal relations with other beings by courtesy and even genuine
beings. (When driving, it is very important that one not get too close to a hole in
the road.) Parthood, spatiotemporal distance, and causation initially seem to be good
candidates for being perfectly natural relations that do not supervene on other
perfectly natural properties and relations. Note that all facts about beings by courtesy
supervene on and are grounded in facts about genuine beings. So none of those
(^68) See Eddon (2013) and Wilson (2012) for further reasons to doubt that supervenience and non-
fundamentality go hand in hand. 69
However, as we will see in sections 8.2 and 8.3, there are reasons not to (merely) use a notion of
ground to illuminate whether something is a being-by-courtesy. 70
71 Compare these remarks with those of Fine (2001).
See McDermott (1969: 40, 70) for a presentation and discussion of this view and the arguments for it.