The Fragmentation of Being

(やまだぃちぅ) #1

contemplation. Suárez’s resolution of this dilemma presupposes that we are not
beings of reason—God after all does cognize us. On Suárez’s view, we are beings in
the eyes of God. But, if we are mere beings by courtesy, we are notfit objects for
divine cognition. We are not beings in the eyes of God. From the point of view of
God, we would be nothing. Far from being created in the image of God, we would be
mere shadows of God’s true creations.
Suárez had the idea that beings of reason are notfit objects of God’s cognition.
A more general view is that cognition should be directed away from beings by
courtesy and towards the fully real to the extent that this is possible. This seems to
be the attitude of Kant. Recall that, for Kant, given the natures that we in fact have,
ignorance of things in themselves is inescapable. This is a fact to be regretted rather
than merely acknowledged. In some way, it would be better (or perhaps we would be
better off) if we were to know things as they are in themselves.^3
Kant famously distinguishes betweenthings in themselvesandappearances.^4 Let us
say thatmere phenomenaare those appearances that are not numerically identical
with something that can be properly considered as it is in itself. Those interpreters of
Kant who hold that the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is
merely a distinction between two ways of considering one and the same set of objects
will deny that there are mere phenomena in my sense, as will those interpreters who
think that the distinction is one between two sets of properties of one and the same
set of entities.^5 There might be some appearances that are not mere phenomena, but
my current view is that some appearances are mere phenomena. Among the mere
phenomena are the objects of outer sense. My current inclination is to think that
mere phenomenaare beings of reason. They are derivative entities, that is, entities
that enjoy a deficient mode of reality, which Kant callsempirical reality, whereas
those things that are not mere phenomena enjoy a better mode of being. Things in
themselves enjoytranscendental reality.^6 It sucks for us that our knowledge is limited
to mere phenomena or to aspects of things that do not inform us of the fundamental
features of that which they are aspects of. In the Kantian philosophy, there is a
connection between a kind of ontological status and a kind of evaluative status: things
in themselves would be better to know, and we unfortunately must settle for
(genuine) knowledge of appearances.^7 If we ourselves are mere phenomena, then
we are not the best objects of our own knowledge. This would be a disquieting result.


(^3) Langton (1998: 13–14, 30, 42–3) stresses Kant’s expressions of loss and dismay at our ignorance of
things in themselves. 4
The distinction appears early in the B-edition of theCritique of Pure Reason(Kant 1999a: 112, Bxx)
and is frequently appealed to thereafter in both versions. 5
See Alison (2004) for a classic defense of a“one-world view.”Langton (1998) is another. For a recent
and sophisticated defense of the two-worlds view, see Stang (2014). 6
7 Gibson (1998: 23) also suggests that Kant believes in two kinds of existence.
Witt (2003: 5, 94–6) suggests that Aristotle also accepts a normative hierarchy that goes hand in hand
with an ontological hierarchy. The actual is ontologically prior to the potential and is prior in value as well.


 PERSONS AND VALUE

Free download pdf