Unfortunately, in the previous chapter, I argued from the premise that shadows,
holes, cracks, and other entities that I called“almost nothings”exist to the conclusion
that being itself is not fundamental.
However, we belong to many different kinds: we are persons, we are animals, we
are living beings, we are physical objects, and we are concrete beings. If any of those
kinds corresponds to a fundamental mode of being, then we are fully real. One
plausible candidate for being a kind corresponding to a fundamental mode of being is
the kindconcrete object, since on some traditions, the distinction between the
concrete and the abstract marks a genuine ontological divide: the mode of being of
concreta isexistence, whereas abstract objects, strictly speaking, do notexistbut
rather enjoy a different mode of being, such asvalidity(in Lotze 1889) orideal being
(in Husserl 2005a and 2005b), orsubsistence(in Russell 1997 and Meinong 1904).
Unfortunately, the domain of concreta appears to contain mere beings by courtesy
as well. The obvious examples of beings by courtesy are mere aggregates of sub-
stances such as piles of trash or heaps of sand, arbitrary undetached parts, and
arbitrary fusions of entities. Similar worries arise about the kindmaterial object:
each of the above objects is a material object. The judgment that these entities exist at
all is somewhat contentious, at least among philosophers, although no parent of
small children can deny that they create numerous heaps and piles of other entities
on a daily basis. (At the end of each day, I disassemble many such piles of clothing,
drawings, toys, pets, and miscellaneous recyclables.)
It’s not nuts to think that all simples and composites of simples are ontologically
on a par, all enjoying equal reality, and hence heaps and piles are fully real, as well as
arbitrary undetached parts of things. But if you are like me, you smell more than a
whiff of unreality about some of these entities, and you think that neitherconcrete
objectnormaterial objectcorresponds to a fundamental mode of being.
Mere aggregates and arbitrary undetached parts are not living beings, animals, or
persons. So the possibility thatliving being, animal,orpersoncorrespond to
fundamental modes of being is not yet eliminated. I won’t examine whether
being alive or being an animal correspond to a fundamental mode of being here,
butinthenextsectionIwillbriefly discuss whether being a person corresponds to a
fundamental mode.^19
6.4 Interlude: Personhood as a Fundamental Mode
of Being or as a Fundamental PropertyThere are two strategies for arguing that being a person is a fundamental mode of
being that I will not defend, but which, due to their historical importance, deserve at
least a brief discussion.
(^19) In section 1.2, we briefly mentioned Heidegger’s (1962: 285) view that living beings that are not
Dasein have as their mode of beingLife.