what follows, I will focus not on emergentcausal powers but rather on emergent
properties.^29
What could those novel properties be? One candidate class of properties is the
class ofqualia, which we will turn to next. Qualia are properties likethe feel one has
when one tastes an orangeandthe way cinnamon smells.
Let’s start with the putative case for the fundamentality of qualia. The case will
unsurprisingly be very contentious. For now, let’s use the labelphysical propertiesfor
the natural properties discoverable via fundamental physics. First premise: there is a
possible world that is just like the actual world with respect to the distribution of the
perfectly natural physical properties and relations but that differs with respect to the
distribution of qualia. One such world is a world in which all qualia are absent, even
though there are biological creatures much like us.^30 Let us grant for now that there is
such a world.
Second, the case for the fundamentality of qualia employs a putative sufficient
condition for being a perfectly natural property:Pis a perfectly natural property ifP
is a qualitative property and the distribution ofPfails to supervene on the distribu-
tion of all other perfectly natural properties and relations. (What is a qualitative
property? Hard question—we’ll discuss it briefly in section 6.7. For now, it suffices to
note that on any acceptable account of the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction,
qualia are qualitative properties.) Note that, if thefirst premise is true, then some
qualia fail to supervene on the distribution of all of the perfectly naturalphysical
properties and relations.
Third, the case depends on the plausible hunch that there are no other perfectly
natural properties and relations than the perfectly natural physical properties and
relations that are good candidates for being among the supervenience base of
qualia.^31 So some qualia fail to supervene on the distribution of all other perfectly
natural properties and relations, hence, given our sufficient condition, are themselves
perfectly natural properties and relations.
So far, (perhaps) so good. But even if we grant each step in the argument, we aren’t
yet in a position to conclude that persons are fully real. True, no less-than-fully-real
object can enjoy a perfectly natural property or stand in a perfectly natural relation:
but even if we have established that qualia are fundamental, we haven’t yet estab-
lished that it ispersonswho instantiate the qualia. And this is the next thing that
would need to be established in order to successfully argue that persons are fully real.
(^29) Note that it does not strictly follow from the fact that causal powers supervene on properties that
certain causal powers are not themselves perfectly natural properties. However, I will assume that they
are not. 30
These are philosophical zombies in Chalmers’s (1997: 95) sense. The argument presented here is
heavily indebted to Chalmers 31 ’s work.
In short, I reject the hypothesisfloated by Chalmers (1997: 126–7) that there are“proto-phenomenal”
properties.