For there are some possibly thorny issues concerning how persons enjoy temporary
properties that should be addressed.
One version of endurantism is the so-called relationalist version of endurantism,
according to which many of what we took to be properties are really relations
to times (or regions of space–time). On this view, when an enduring object transi-
tions from being spherical att 1 to pyramid-shaped att 2 , it is by way of bearing
theis spherical atrelation tot 1 and theis pyramid-shaped at relationtot 2. The same
sort of story is true of temporary qualia: when one goes from enjoying chocolatey
flavor to feeling queasy, this is in virtue of standing in theenjoying chocolateyflavor
relation to some times, and standing in thefeeling queasyrelation to other times.
Strictly, there are no qualiapropertiesbut there are qualiarelations.
Consider now the attempt to move from the fundamentality of qualia to the full
reality of persons. Recall the principle that only fully real objects can instantiate
perfectly natural properties or relations. So if qualia relations are perfectly natural
and a person stands in one to a time, then it follows that the person in question is also
fully real. But it also follows that the time is fully real, since it is as much of a relatum
of this relation as the person is. This seems a little troubling, since it is surprising that
an argument concerning qualia could yield substantive conclusions about the nature
of times. But perhaps we should accept that it could. If we think that times are not
fundamental items in our ontology, but rather are something like logical construc-
tions out of space–time regions, then we should probably never have said that qualia
(or other“temporary intrinsic properties”for that matter) were relations totimes
rather thanspace–time regions.
If we want to avoid this consequence, we need a different version of endurantism.
I don’t think adverbialism, according to which what is represented by the copula itself
is in some way a relation to times (or to space–times?) will do the trick, but to be
honest I am not sure. Suppose we adopt a version of endurantism according to which
an object is F at a timetin virtue of standing in the is-at-trelation to F. Somehow the
timetis incorporated into the fundamental instantiation relation that material
objects bear towards their properties. Should we conclude thattis thereby funda-
mental as well? (Perhaps not, if the various time-relativized instantiation relations are
not fundamental. Things are unclear here.) What about a view in which facts, such as
the fact that the ball is red, obtain only relative to some times but not others?^36 On
this view, a time does not enter into the constitution of temporal facts, but does enter
into the constitution of a higher-order fact, namely, the fact concerning the temporal
location of thefirst-order fact. I am also unclear about the consequences of this view,
but we should recall that some proponents of facts do not think that the mode of
being of a fact must match the mode of being of its constituents.^37
(^36) I thank Hao Hong for suggesting this view. (^37) Recall our discussion in section 3.7.