being. Among the ways of being that are given areExistenz(the kind of being enjoyed
by creatures like ourselves), readiness-to-hand (the kind of being enjoyed by equip-
ment), presentness-at-hand (the kind of being enjoyed by bits of matter), and
subsistence (the kind of being enjoyed by abstract objects).^17 Somehow from these
original experiences of these modes of being we have constructed the general concept
of being that applies to everything there is regardless of its mode of being.^18 It is hard
to see how this construction was created and therein stems the motivation for the
fundamental ontological project ofBeing and Time.We’ll return to Heidegger’s
ontological investigations in chapter 1.
In a similar vein, Meinong held that the distinction betweensubsistenceand
existenceis given and apprehended immediately.^19 On this view, modes of being
arepresented to us; those who cannot see the distinction between subsistence and
existence suffer from a kind of blindness. A proper phenomenological description of
our experience will encode information about the modes of being of those entities
presented to us. If you don’t notice that there are modes of being, you need to more
carefully attend to what is given. Back to the things themselves, and to how those
things themselves are!
Finally, some historically prominent champions of ontological pluralism have had
what can be broadly construed aslogicalmotivations for the doctrine as well.
Consider, for example, Aristotle’s argument that being is not a genus, which turns
on complicated logical and metaphysical issues.^20 According to Aristotle, species of
the same genera are differentiated from the genera and one another by characteristic
features appropriately named“differentiating characteristics”. For example, the spe-
cies human is of the genus animal with the differentiating characteristic being
rationality. Also according to Aristotle, a differentiating characteristic cannot fall
under the genera that it differentiates. It follows from these two claims that being
cannot be a genus. For, if it were a genus, it would be differentiated from its species by
some characteristic. But this characteristic would itself be a being, and hence would
fall under the genus that it differentiates.
Why did Aristotle accept that no differentiating characteristic can fall under the
genus that it differentiates? W.D. Ross’s (1924: 235–7) diagnosis is that, if genera
can be predicated of their differentiating characteristics, then we could predicate
animalof rationality. (Recall that the species of humanity is defined via the genus of
animal and the differentiating characteristic of rationality.) But it makes no sense to
say that rationality is an animal. Agreed. But what this shows us is merely that we
cannot always predicate a genus of a differentiating characteristic, not that we never
can. Aquinas, who seems (in some places) to endorse Aristotle’s argument, suggests
(^17) See Heidegger’sBeing and Time(1962: 67, 97–8, 121, 258–9, 285, and 382).
(^18) I thank Peter Simons for helpful comments here.
(^19) See Meinong (1983: 58) and Findlay (1933: 74) for discussion.
(^20) See Aristotle’sMetaphysicsIII.3, 998b21 (Aristotle 1984b: 1577).