of properties, we could always add a clause to the definition of“is natural”requiring
this. The more interesting upshot would be that degrees of being would emerge as the
more general notion, which would suggest that it is also the notion that is prior.
That these analyses are equally defensible is predicted by the NVH, since on the
NVH each claim is a mere notational variant of its analogue.
Further evidence for the NVH stems from the fact that there are many important
questions about naturalness for which there are parallel questions about degree
of being.
If we take naturalness as primitive, we can define the notion of a degree of being.
But there are hard questions facing anyone who takes the notion of naturalness as
primitive. For example, consider the following questions:
- Isbeing naturalnatural? How natural isbeing natural to degree n?
- Isx is more natural than ymore basic thanx is natural to degree n?
- Can things other than properties have degrees of naturalness?
If we take degrees of being as primitive, we can define the notion of naturalness.
But there are equally hard questions facing anyone who takes the notion of degrees of
being as primitive, such as the following:
- Does the property of maximally existing maximally exist? To what extent does
the property of existing to degreenexist? - Isx exists more than ymore basic thanx exists to degree n?
- Can things other than properties have degrees of being?
That parallel questions arise in this fashion ispredictedby the NVH. On the NVH,
questions 1–3 are merely notional variants of questions 4–6, and so, given the NVH, it
is unsurprising that parallel questions arise about one and same primitive notion.^17
Before proceeding to further assess the case against NVH, I’ll discuss one prelim-
inary objection. In general, necessarily equivalent properties or relations needn’tbe
identical. If we think of properties and relations as closely tied to meanings in natural
language or in thought, then we will definitely distinguish some necessarily equiva-
lent properties such as triangularity and trilaterality. Similarly, even if it turns out
that naturalness and degrees of being necessarily co-vary, in what sense could they be
the same phenomena, given that“naturalness”and“degree of being”clearly differ in
meaning and theoretical role?
Two responses. First, it is not obvious to me that“naturalness”and“degree of
being”do differ in meaning. The dominant conception of naturalness is a concept
of fundamentality, and fundamentality and ontological superiority of some sort seem
to me closely tied together. Moreover, given my previous arguments, degree of being
(^17) Questions 2 and 5 are perhaps less exciting, since they might arise for any degreed notion. This
doesn’t undercut NVH’s prediction that both 2 and 5 will arise, but it does make that prediction less
interesting. Thanks to Alex Skiles for discussion here.