8. Being and Ground
8.1 Introduction
Anyone familiar with metaphysics as it is done in the analytic tradition at the time
proximate to my writing this introduction knows that the theme of grounding is the
topicdu jour. Talk of ground, metaphysical explanation, the in virtue of relation,
“because,”and so forth, is ubiquitous in contemporary philosophical discourse.
Largely this is because of the excellent work of Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer,
among others, that gave rise to the current debate. Partly this is because philosophers
in general are always looking for a new toy to play with. But one cannot deny that
such expressions have enjoyed great currency in philosophical theorizing well before
the present age, and that the task of understanding them is one that philosophers
cannot in good conscience shirk. Especially important are the potential connections
between ground and being.^1 For these reasons, I reluctantly contribute this chapter to
the ever-growing literature. Admittedly, I want to play with the toys too.
Here are the questions and issues I plan to focus on. Some of them are specifically
about ground. Should we be pluralists about grounding? On the assumption that talk
of ground is talk of a relation, is there exactly one grounding relation? If there are
many grounding relations, how are they related to one another? Is there a generic
relation of grounding, and is it a mere disjunction of the specific relations, or is it
unified by analogy? In what sense is ground a metaphysical primitive? Is talk of
ground really schematic talk best replaced by specific discussions of other relations
already well studied, as is suggested by Wilson (2014: 539)? Some of them are about
the relation between being and ground. Ifxis grounded iny, does it follow thatyis in
some way ontologically superior tox? If so, which way? Can we define, reduce, or in
some way understand ground in terms of kinds of ontological superiority? Are
relations of ontological superiorityipso factogrounding relations? Does the induce-
ment of ontological superiority in some way account for the unity of grounding? Is
grounding itself an entity in the ontology, and if so what mode of being does it enjoy?
We have a lot of surface to cover. Here’s my plan for proceeding in this chapter. In
the remainder of this introduction, I willfirst discuss the question of whether ground
(^1) As Silverman (2013: 106) notes, that there is a tight connection between being and ground is as old
as Plato.