parts.^26 (Intermediate cases are possible: perhaps artifacts are more real than their
arbitrary undetached parts but less real than their constituent particles.)
As I mentioned, Schaffer (2009) argues that the fundamental task of metaphysics is
to determine which things are fundamental and which things are derivative. I agree
with Schaffer that this is one of the fundamental tasks of metaphysics. Schaffer (2009)
also argues that this was understood to be the fundamental task of metaphysicians by
many of the greatfigures in the history of metaphysics, such as Plato, Aristotle,
Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Perhaps he is correct—but note that each of thesefigures
also believed that some things were ontologically superior to others. That which is
prior is that which is ontologically superior. The appeal to traditional metaphysical
practice does not obviously support taking grounding as either ideologically or
metaphysically primitive.
One might worry that the notion of grounding cannot be analyzed in terms of the
notion ofbeing more real thansince there might be metaphysical systems in which
the grounding relation imposes more structure than the being more real than
relation. A specific example might be helpful. Consider a metaphysic according to
which there are concrete particulars and their modes, which are particularized and
dependent attributes. Suppose there are two concrete particulars, one of which enjoys
a mode of blueness whilst the other enjoys a mode of redness. Intuitively, the mode of
redness is grounded solely by the red substance whereas the mode of blueness is
grounded solely by the blue substance. Plausibly, both substances are equally real
whereas both modes are equally real, and both substances are more real than both
modes. And so information about theparticularconnection between the mode of
redness and the red substance is lost if we identify the grounding relation with the
being more real thanrelation.
There are a couple of ways to respond to this worry. One obvious response is to
account for the particular connection in terms of the instantiation relation itself. The
appearance that there is more to the grounding structure arises because there is a
further relation in play. A second response is similar to thefirst, but far more
concessive to the objection: instead of directly definingx grounds yin terms ofxis
more real than y, identify the grounding relation with the disjunction of conjunctions
consisting ofx is more real than yand the other connective relations one already
accepts on the basis of other metaphysical commitments.^27 For example, in an
ontology that consists of modes, events, and substances, one might accept the
(^26) Peter Finocchiaro has suggested to me that it might be worthwhile to instead treat“integrated whole”
as the contradictory of“mere aggregate,”and so use“integrated whole”to stand for those wholes that are at
least as real as their parts. 27
A related strategy has been suggested to me by Alex Skiles: rather than identify the grounding relation
with the disjunction of these conjunctions, identify the grounding relation with the relation of instantiating
one of these conjunctions. (In short, prefer quantification over the conjunctions rather than disjoining
them.) Skiles’s strategy is the one that we should use if it is contingent which connecting relations exist;
thanks to Joshua Spencer for pointing this out.