following:x grounds yif and only ifxis more real thanyand either (i)xinstantiatesy
or (ii)yis an event involvingx. In general, there is never a bare relation of grounding
between distinct individuals, but rather there is always a further relation between
them. That there is always a further relation between entities related by grounding is
part of the basis of Wilson’s (2014) argument that grounding does no metaphysical
work, a conclusion which Ifind congenial, at least with respect to entity grounding.^28
Taking this second strategy is consistent with claiming that grounding is ideo-
logically primitive. The second strategy doesn’t try to explain what“grounding”
means, but rather tells you what grounding—the entity in the ontology—is. On the
second strategy, grounding might be highly disjunctive if there is a sufficiently large
number of connecting relations in play, and yet each disjunct will share a common
metaphysical core provided by themore real thanrelation. On this strategy, what
grounding is cannot be assessed without doing somefirst-order metaphysics; you
won’t learn a lot about grounding simply by taking grounding as the sole focus of
your metaphysical exploration.
How fares the quest for the“correct logic”of ground on this second strategy?
Probably no better or worse than the question for the correct“logic”of parthood or
metaphysical necessity. In each case, we bring to metaphysics some notion that
permits implementation in a variety of formal systems. Some aspects of these systems
will strike us as more reflective of the“core”of the relevant notion. But I would reject
a methodology that licensed us to make mereological judgments independently of
metaphysical investigations of the kinds of things that there are and how they relate to
one another.^29 (A mereology with facts in it might look very different than one
without facts, for example.) Similarly, I hesitate to grant a given modal“logic”the
status of being that which all modal metaphysics must accommodate.^30 Implemen-
tation of a notion in a formal system is an excellent way to clarify the commitments of
one’s theories that make use of that notion, but it is not a substitute for the theories
themselves.^31 Does this mean that grounding is not methodologically primitive?
I think not, for one may still develop such formal systems in advance offirst-order
metaphysics, and some evaluation of them is permissible in advance—such as whether
the system in question is internally consistent, for example, or has some other more
interesting formal properties. One can note that certain formally stated axioms strike
one as intuitively plausible. What one is not permitted to do is to treat questions about
grounding assettledin advance offirst-order metaphysical inquiry.
(^28) That entity grounding does no metaphysical work over and above degrees of being and the
connective relations we already need between objects was the conclusion of the appendix to McDaniel
(2013b), which has been revised and incorporated in this section. Wilson’s (2014) critique is far more
comprehensive, and targets the proponents of grounding as a relation between facts as well. I’ll have more
to say about Wilson 29 ’s broadside against grounding in section 8.3.
31 This is forcefully argued for in Donnelly (2011).^30 PaceWilliamson (2013).
Compare with Wilson (2014), who doubts the propriety of asking questions about ground.