In sections 8.2 and 8.3, we looked at two apparently competing views about the
nature of grounding, one by Schaffer and Baumgarten and one by Fine and Bolzano.
But what if they are onlyapparentlyin competition? One way to avoid competition
would be to embrace grounding pluralism, and hold that bothfigures have focused
on distinct but important relations of grounding.^73 Neither Fine nor Schaffer has
offered definitions or analyses of their respective notions, and they seem to differ in
many important respects. What ensures that they are talking about the same phe-
nomenon in the world rather than two different relations?^74
A second way to avoid competition is for one of the parties to the debate to provide
a reductive account of their opponent’s relation, either in terms of their preferred
relation of grounding or in terms of some other relations or features. For an example
of the latter attempt, consider whether the proponent of fact grounding could
understand entity grounding in terms of what Fine (1995a) calls “ontological
dependence,”a notion that is in turn understood in terms of strict essence.^75 Note
that when Schaffer (2009: 375) claims that pure sets are grounded in the empty set, he
cites as a precedent Fine (1994a). But in that piece, no claim about the grounding of
sets is defended; rather, what is defended are claims about the essences of sets. This
suggests that Schaffer is really talking about something like Fine’s (1995a) notion of
ontological dependence.^76
That said, I’ll focus here on whether two apparently distinct relations are in
fact inter-definable in the sense that the entity-grounder can understand fact
grounding in terms of entity grounding and vice versa. Surprisingly, in both
cases, it is by viewing the allegedly distinct relation as a mere restriction on the
more general relation.
This is easier to see in the case of entity grounding. The entity-grounder thinks
that grounding relates entities of any ontological category. Facts are entities. So
grounding can relate facts to other facts. The entity-grounder can then take the
fact-grounder to be focusing on a categorially restricted relation of which Schaffer’s
entity grounding is the more general case.^77 From the perspective of the entity-
(^73) Mulligan (2009: 51) notes that Meinong initially thought that grounding related only objectives but
later came to think that it could relate objectives to non-objectives as well. This suggests that he switched
views, and hence there are two views to switch between. 74
Daly (2012: 98) suggests that talk of grounding is entirely a philosopher’s invention. If this is so,
neither Fine nor Schaffer can appeal to ordinary usage of grounding locutions to settle their debate or to
helpfix what phenomenon in the world is the target of theorizing. Sider (2011: 163)floats the possibility of
recognizing both entity grounding and fact grounding within one’s system. See also Sider (2011: 161–4)
for arguments against entity grounding. 75
76 Thanks to Shamik Dasgupta for discussion here.
Conversely, Schaffer (2012: 124) suggests that Fine might be talking about an explanation relation
grounded in but distinct from grounding. 77
In personal communication, Schaffer has communicated to me that he is open to understanding
Fine’s notion of grounding as a restriction on entity grounding. Sider (2011: 162) worries about under-
standing Fine in this way on the assumption that the relata of grounding are propositions; but as