Finally,the existentialist view. On the existentialist view, true essentialist claims
aboutxentail thatxhas some form of actual existence.^34 We can distinguish the
existentialist view from the possibilist view only if we can distinguish actual and
possible forms of existence.^35
It might seem that the existentialist view is supported by the view that propositions
are structured entities that have“what they are about”as constituents. One might
think that a proposition exists in a world only if its constituents exist in that world.
My total propositional essence is about me, and hence, in some manner, contains me
as a constituent. Hence, on this line of thought, my total propositional essence exists
in a world only if I do. Further, my total propositional essence is true at a world only
if it exists at that world. Hence, the existentialist view is true.^36
Even if we grant that propositions are structured entities, there are a couple of ways
to resist this line of thought.^37 First, there is the distinction between a proposition’s
being trueata world versus its being trueina world.^38 In addition, one could argue
that it is the former rather than the latter that is relevant here. Second, even if we
grant the premises of this argument, it is not clear that they support the conclusion.
All that this argument supports is that there is some mode of being that objects enjoy
in worlds in which propositions about them are true; it does not support the claim
that this mode of being is a form of actual existence. In fact, it does not even support
the claim that this mode is a fundamental mode. Only when we supplement the
argument with considerations from section 9.2, specifically the claim that only
fundamental things can have essences, are we entitled to conclude that the constitu-
ents of true propositional essences must exist in some fundamental way.^39 But need
this be a kind ofactualexistence?
(^34) Wippel (2000: 401) says that, for Godfrey of Fontaines, an essence cannot be understood as actual
unless its corresponding existence is also actual, and hence the possessor of the essence exists. He also notes
that Godfrey defends the real identity of essence and existence in creatures. Marrone (1988: 42) suggests that
Scotus was attracted to the view that essence requires existence. Gassendi, in hisFifth Set of Objectionsto
Descartes’Meditationsalso suggests that something has an essence only if it actually exists; see Descartes
(1991a: 225). Wilson’s (2003: 162) discussion of Descartes’Fifth Meditationsuggests some sympathy with
existentialism. Frost (2010) argues that Aquinas allows for an essentialist claim to be true at a time in which
its object does not exist, but also holds that the object must exist at some time or other in order for that
essentialist claim to be true; see Frost (2010: 213, fn. 27). This suggests that Aquinas is also an existentialist.
Remarks by Pereira (2007: 121–4, 132) also suggest that Suárez is an existentialist, though in light of the fact
that Suárez also recognizes merely possible beings, it is also tempting to attribute the possibilist view to him. 35
Shamik Dasgupta has suggested to me a weaker version of the existentialist view, according to which
only actual objects have strict essences, and yet there can be truths about their strict essences in possible
worlds in which they do not exist. 36
Miller (2002: 86–95) discusses and rejects the claim that a proposition about Socrates can exist either
temporally prior to or modally independent of Socrates himself. 37
As Jeff Brower has pointed out to me, many of the long-dead proponents of strict essences that I have
discussed would eschew this view of propositions. 38
39 See Adams (1981).
It would be interesting to contrast the view described here with the view of Williamson (2013),
according to which everything necessarily exists, but some of these necessary existents are only contin-
gently concrete.