essentialist fact is syntactic garbage. (We discussed a similar view about grounding
facts as well in section 8.2.)
In general, there seems to be patterns to facts about essences. The existence of
Socrates’s singleton is grounded in the existence of Socrates; the existence of Kit
Fine’s singleton is grounded in the existence of Kit Fine; the existence of my singleton
is grounded in the existence of me. The pattern is obvious, and it demands a
metaphysical explanation, one that seemingly cannot be met if essence facts are
inapt to be grounded.^44
So let’s explore putative candidates for being the ontic grounds of essential facts. To
make things more concrete, let’s consider David Lewis and his total propositional
essence. Here I explorefive candidates for his ultimate ontic essence. Thefirst candidate
is David Lewis himself. The second is a proper constituent of David Lewis; on one
traditional metaphysic, David Lewis is a hylomorphic compound of matter and form,
and, in my terminology, his substantial form is the ontic ground for his total propos-
itional essence.^45 The third candidate to be explored here is the set of properties
attributed to David Lewis by his total propositional essence. The fourth candidate is a
traditional theistic answer that essences are ideas in the mind of God. In my termin-
ology, the ontic ground of David Lewis’s total propositional essence is an idea in the
mind of God. Finally, afifth candidate is that David Lewis’s total propositional essence is
asui generisentity. This isn’t even an exhaustive list; for example, a sixth candidate,
which will be explored in section 9.6 but not here, is David Lewis’smodeofbeing.^46
Has anyone held the view that David Lewis is the ultimate ontic ground for his
total propositional essence? That David Lewis might be an ontic essence for himself
is suggested by some remarks by Aristotle in hisMetaphysicsVII.4, 1029b1–3, 13– 6
(Aristotle 1984b: 1625–26):
Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and
one of these was thought to be the essence, we must investigate this. Andfirst let us say
something about it in the abstract. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of
(^44) Dasgupta (2016) recognizes that there is a pattern here, but attempts to account for it in terms of the
logical consequences of various essentialist claims rather than by providing a grounding-based explanation.
Fine (2012b: 11) claims that there is a set of fundamental essential truths that when conjoined with non-
essential truths yield all the essential truths; this also suggests a metaphysical explanation for this kind of
pattern. 45
There are other proper constituents worth considering. Perhaps Lewis’s matter and form are
collectivelythe ontic ground. This is suggested by Oderberg (2007: 65), but I think his considered view is
that things are their essences; see Oderberg (2007: 121). But perhaps their forms are their ultimate essences;
see Oderberg (2007: 247). Pasnau (2011: 121, 551) notes that, for Aquinas and other medievals, common
matter is also part of the essences of created corporeal things. Brower (2014: 112–13, 200–3) holds that, for
Aquinas, both matter and substantial form determine the essences of hylomorphic compounds; see also
Galluzzo (2014: 231–4). Another candidate for being the ontic essence of David Lewis is his proper parts
considered collectively; such a view is neutral on whether David Lewis is a hylomorphic compound.
However, I have only so much space and I imagine that my readers have only so much patience. 46
Provided that we reify modes of being. In section 9.6, we will pursue the question of whether facts
about modes of being ground facts about essence independently of whether modes of being are entities.