some sense among that strict essence? If the strict essence of an object is its existence,
can its existence also ground its strict essence?
Just to illustrate the complexities involved, consider an entitykwhose mode of
being is represented by“E”and whose strict essence is exhausted by having that
mode of being. Consider now the following propositions P and Q:
P=k’s strict essence wholly consists inExx=k.
Q=Exx=k.Can we say that Q is the ground of P? I assume that Q grounds P only if Q entails P.
Even if it can be contingent what mode of being a thing has and contingent what
strict essence a thing has, we might think that this entailment still holds. So at least
one necessary condition for Q’s grounding P is met. Does P entail Q? If we assume
that (i) necessarily, facts aboutk’s essence obtain only ifkexists in some way or other,
and (ii) necessarily,kexists only ifkenjoysExx=k, then we do get that P entails Q as
well. But symmetric entailment does not rule out asymmetric grounding!^96
What I’ve just sketched is a modest and local attempt at grounding some essences
in modes of being. Let’s now consider a very ambitious attempt to partially ground all
essential facts in facts about the modes of being of various entities. Let’s restrict our
focus to the essences of sets, since people’s intuitions about their essences seem
reasonably (or unreasonably)firm. In general, it is part of the essence of a set that it
has the elements that it has. Is this general fact about the essences of sets collectively
grounded in the particular facts about specific sets or does the general fact partially
ground each particular fact? Neither choice is mandatory, but my inclination is to
take the general fact as prior to its instances—perhaps much like how causal laws
seem to have a kind of priority over the patterns they induce. That is, this general fact
has the character of a general law.
The fact that the general law is necessarily true, while in many cases it is contingent
which sets exist since it is contingent which members of these sets exist, doesn’t settle
this question. It does settle that the general law can’t be a full ground for the specific
essentialist facts, since the general law doesn’t entail the specific essentialist facts, at
least on the assumption that the specific essentialist facts are true only if the relevant
sets exist. (Recall our discussion in sections 9.3 and 9.4 of this issue.)
(^96) One might also wonder whether what mode of being an entity enjoys is grounded in its strict essence.
Mulligan (2006a: 37–8) proposes this view. Mulligan has also directed my attention towards this passage
written by the important phenomenologist Max Scheler in which this position is defended:“I am of the
view... that modes of being can be distinguished from essence (in mente, notin re) but that essence (for
example the essence of the person, the essence of life etc.) also determines (bestimmt) the mode of being.”
(This is Mulligan’s translation of Scheler’sGesammelte Werke, vol. 9, Späte Schriften, p. 285). I thank Kevin
Mulligan heartily for discussion on this issue and directing me towards Scheler’s remarks. I won’t pursue
this question further here, as we have already too many questions on our plate as it is. However, it definitely
needs further thought; I would think one attracted to the Cartesian view discussed in section 9.3 wouldfind
the position that essences ground modes of being especially attractive.