Before closing this chapter, one last fun question: is the degree of being of a thing
modally essential to it?^102 (We’ve focused so far only on whether modes of being are
essential.) It is difficult to come up with plausible metaphysics in which the degree of
being of an entity changes across worlds, but let me sketch a putative system. First,
suppose counterpart theory aboutde remodality is true, and that the modal essence
of an entity is a function of how similar it is to other entities in other possible worlds.
Suppose that, unlike Lewis (1986), we take counterpart theory in full generality and
hence are counterpart theorists about thede remodal properties of properties and
relations.^103 Finally, let us say that what determines the counterpart relation between
properties is similarity of pattern of instantiation across worlds. It seems to me then
that there could be two properties that are counterparts of each other, but such that
one property is perfectly natural whilst the other is determined by more natural
properties in the world it is in. (Consider, for example, a possible world in which the
pattern of instantiation of every actual intrinsic property and relation isfilled with
distinct intrinsic properties and relations, and moreover, there is a further set of
properties and relations among which those supervene.) Since on my view natural-
ness just is degree of being as defined on properties, if such a metaphysics were true,
there would be entities that could have been more or less real than they actually are.
9.8 Chapter Summary
The focus of this chapter was on the connections between being and essence, where
“essence”was primarily understood asstrict essence. We discussed whether every
entity has a strict essence; I argued that plausibly not. We discussed whether truths
about essence implied truths about existence; I plumped for a positive answer to this
question, but discussed several alternative views. We discussed whether essences
should be understood as entities, and if so, what kind of entity they might be. We also
discussed whether truths about essences are grounded not in entities in general but
rather in the ways in which entities exist. Finally, we assessed whether the properties
an object strictly essentially has are had as a matter of modal necessity.
(^102) Hirsch (1997b: 49) answers affirmatively. (^103) Heller (1998) has such a view.