Concluding Unsystematic Postscript
We’ve nearly reached the end of this long book, which I hope has not worn out its
welcome. It’s time to take stock and call it a day.
I have not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that there are modes of being
or various forms of ontological superiority. Such things cannot be demonstrated
beyond a reasonable doubt. Metaphysics is and always will be a highly speculative
endeavor, and its conclusions subject to rational reappraisal. That we speculate in a
disciplined yet humble way should be our aim in metaphysics. Certainty is neither to
be sought nor hoped for.
So what was accomplished?
One important goal of this book was to stress the importance of separately evaluating
the metaphysical question of whether being fragments and the semantic question of
whether ontological expressions are polysemous. I believe that I have shown why
distinguishing these questions is both important and fruitful. And I have done this
while still maintaining that there are interesting connections between quantification and
being. Quantifiers are the apt linguistic home for modes of being rather than predicates,
which are the apt linguistic homes for properties.
I have taken old ideas and put them in new clothing, but I have also provided new
applications to these old ideas and connected them up with contemporary problems
in metaphysics. One of these ideas is that the notion of analogy is critically important
to several topics in ontology. Along the way, I hope to have indirectly shown the
relevance for contemporary metaphysics of the history of philosophy.
I believe that I have demonstrated the fecundity of the idea that there are modes
of being and various forms of ontological superiority. There are many varieties of
ontological pluralism corresponding to the many applications of the doctrine to
extant philosophical problems and disputes. In not every case is an instance of
ontological pluralism the best solution available, but in many cases I think it will
be, and I have produced many applications for your evaluation.
But I have also taken these applications on a case-by-case basis and have not
attempted to provide a unified, single version of ontological pluralism to handle all of
the problematic phenomena I have discussed, which included substance, time,
categorial differences, possibility and necessity, presence and absence, persons and