1.5 Ways of Believing in Ways of Being
Let’s now abstract away from the particulars of Heidegger’s theory in order to discern
some general lessons. There are different kinds of existenceifthere are possible
meanings for semantically primitive restricted quantifiers such that (i) each restricted
quantifier has a non-empty domain that is properly included in the domain of the
unrestricted quantifier, (ii) none of these domains overlap, and (iii) each meaning is
at least as natural as the meaning of the unrestricted quantifier. On the Heideggerian
view, there are restricted quantifiers that are even more natural than the unrestricted
quantifier. (In order to state this thesis, I used the unrestricted quantifier of ordinary
English, which might not have a perfectly natural meaning; we will return to the
question of whether it does, and the consequences for ontology if it does not, in later
chapters.)
One way to hold (i)–(iii) is by reifying quantifier-meanings. Suppose thatexistence
is a second-order property: a property of properties, or propositional functions.^48
Now consider someone who holds that this second-order property is akin to amere
disjunctionof afinite list of fundamental second-order properties. One might hold
that this property is less natural than the modes of being but is more natural than a mere
disjunction—one might hold that this property is“unified by analogy”;we’ll discuss this
idea more in the next chapter. Regardless, it seems to me that (i)–(iii) also follow from
this person’s beliefs, since these properties are well-suited to serve as the meanings of
semantically primitive restricted quantifiers. However, we have also seen that one can
make sense of (i)–(iii) without reifying meanings: one can believe that things exist in
different ways without believing in entities that are ways in which things exist.
Belief in the conjunction of (i)–(iii) suffices for belief in ways of being. But it is not
necessary. I will now discuss views that seem committed to ways of being without
implying (i)–(iii). In section 1.5.1, we’ll talk a bit more about quantifiers; in section
1.5.2, we’ll discuss worries about quantifying over everything and plural quantifica-
tion; in section 1.5.3, we’ll discuss worries arising from the alleged distinction
between specific existence and individual existence; and, in section 1.5.4, we’ll discuss
whether we’d be better served by using Fine’s (2001) notion oftruth in realityrather
than naturalness when formulating ontological pluralism.
1.5.1 Quantifiers: Some Accounts
I have helped myself to the notion of a quantifier. But what makes an expression a
quantifier expression?
One way to characterize quantifiers is via an account of the kinds of entities that
are their semantic values. One popular view is that the semantic value of quantifiers
are relations between properties.^49 Sometimes these relations are easy to describe but
(^48) See, for example, Russell (1971: 232–3).
(^49) See Westerståhl (2011) for discussion of quantifiers more generally.