The same is true of whatever is the semantic content of quantificational phrases.
Set aside considerations having to do with divine simplicity or modes of being for
now. Suppose that the semantic content of the existential quantifier simply is a
higher-order property, perhaps a property of properties. Let’s assume that it is simply
the property of having at least one instance. Let’s also give it a name. Call it“Sartre.”
The following sentences are each OK:
- Sartre is a property had by the property of being a cat.
- The property of being a cat has at least one instance.
- There is at least one cat.
One and the same semantic content enjoys three different representational
vehicles: name, predicate, and quantifier. In English, we can name whatever entity
is expressed by other linguistic vehicles. It doesn’t follow from this that“Sartre is
identical with there is”is an acceptable sentence.
Similarly, even if God is identical with the kind of specific existence had by divine
beings, or even if God is identical with the kind of existence had by every being
(which is a claim that Aquinas definitely rejects), it does not follow that it makes
sense to write“God is identical with there is”or that the divine name simply has the
same meaning as“some.”The absurd consequence that Kenny draws does not follow
from the doctrine of divine simplicity. Kenny’s argument that Aquinas must have
in mind what Kenny calls“specific”existence is unsuccessful. The conclusion of it
might still be correct, but Kenny has not established it.^71
And one can use the framework here to explicate a clear sense in which God is
identical with his existence while no creaturely thing is identical with her exist-
ence. There is a special mode of existence had by God which is representable by a
special semantically primitive restricted quantifier; it is also denoted by the
name“God,”because it is identical with God. There is a distinct kind of existence
had by creaturely things, or perhaps only by created substances, which is also
representable by a special semantically primitive restricted quantifier. But no
created substance is identical with the special mode of existence had by created
substances.^72
In general, many of the motivations for ontological pluralism previously discussed
do not require taking a stand on whether there is a fundamental difference between
specific and individual existence; in fact, in the next chapter, I’ll speak mainly in terms
(^71) Nor has Kenny (2005a: 43, fn. 26) demonstrated that questions concerning the priority of essence
over existence are vitiated by the failure to distinguish between specific and individual existence. These
questions will be the focus of chapter 9. 72
This is not to say that Aquinas definitely thought about God’s mode of being in terms of perfectly
natural quantifiers. As Brower (2014: 54) points out, this interpretation would be anachronistic. And yet, as
Brower (2014: 51–4) nicely argues, the model described here is still a very useful model for understanding
Aquinas’s thoughts on being. See McDaniel (forthcoming-a) for a discussion of philosophical models in the
history of philosophy.