natural. In either case, insofar as we hold that there is any unity to the feature at all,
we will be under pressure to hold that the feature is analogous.
Can we apply these lessons to the case ofexistence?
2.4 The Analogy of Being
A reasonable ontological scheme is one that could be reasonably believed. We will
address two questions. First, are there reasonable ontological schemes in which
existence is systematically variably polyadic? Second, are there reasonable ontological
schemes in which existence is systematically variably axiomatic? If the answer to
either question is“yes,”then there are reasonable ontological schemes on which it
would be reasonable to hold thatexistenceis analogous. Accordingly, it would be
reasonable to believe in ways of being.
Here, in section 2.4, I discuss reasonable ontological schemes according to which
existence is systematically variably polyadic. In section 2.5, I discuss reasonable
ontological schemes according to which existence is systematically variably axiomatic.
2.4.1 Temporally Relativized Existence and Atemporal Existence
Sometimes we discover that what we previously thought was ann-place property or
relation is really an 1+n-place property or relation. We thought that simultaneity
was absolute, but then we did some physics and learned that simultaneity is
always relative to a reference frame. We didn’t learn from physics that there are
no simultaneous events; we learned that simultaneity doesn’t have the logical form
we thought it had. Note that we learned something about the property that is the
semantic value of“simultaneous”; I don’t think we learned that the predicate
“simultaneous”requires at least three terms to complement it in a complete sen-
tence.^27 We do sometimes discover hidden complexities in our expressions, but when
we do, it is via linguistics rather than physics.
Considerendurantism, the view that objects persist through time by being wholly
present at each moment they exist. Enduring objects frequently undergo change
over time, as when the leaves of a tree change color from green to red. One way
endurantism accommodates change over time is via claiming that many of what
people took to be properties are really relations to regions of time or space–time.^28
For example, the shape of a material object is really a relation to a region of time or
space–time, not a 1-place property, as one might have pre-theoretically thought.
(^27) That said, in what follows, I will temporarily speak as though simultaneity is absolute.
(^28) This is the so-calledrelationaliststrategy for dealing with the so-called Problem of Temporary
Intrinsics. See Haslanger (1989), Lewis (1986: 202–5), McDaniel (2004), and Wasserman (2003) for
discussion.