first-order properties of individuals. More on this momentarily.) Sinceexistenceon
this view is systematically variably polyadic, prima facieexistenceis analogous. The
mode of being had by material objects—call itbeing-there—and the mode of being
had by abstract objects—call itsubsistence—are more natural thanexistence.
Subsistent objects are necessarily outside of space–time. This too might seem
mysterious. Iflocationis metaphysically fundamental, why can’t a number have a
location? However, on the view we have just explored, to be located at a place is
literally to exist at that place. The very being of a number or other abstract object is
not relative to a place, and so, given our analysis oflocationin terms of existence at a
space–time region, no abstract objectcanhave a location.
Finally, there has long been thought to be a close connection betweenbeingand
space and time. Many have taken being outside of time and space to suffice to enjoy a
different mode of being than those things within time or space. See, for example,
Lotze (1884: 438–40), who distinguishes that which exists and that which occurs
from that which has atemporal validity; Husserl (2005a, 2005b), who holds that only
objects in time are real, whereas abstracta enjoy a mode of being called ideality;
Meinong (1983: 52), who holds that numbers and other atemporal abstracta do not
exist but rather subsist; and Russell (1997), who adopts the Meinongian terminology
in this work, and then argues that relations subsist rather than exist. Reinach (1982)
also distinguishes between existence and subsistence; I take him to be following
Husserl and Meinong as well.^34 This sort of view has many precedents, most
famously Plato, who in hisTimaeus(27d5–28a1; Plato (1978: 1161–2) famously
states the doctrine of being versus becoming. This intuitive connection is theoretic-
ally explained by the view explored here, according to whichexistence at a space–time
regionis both a locative relation and a mode of being.
The ontological scheme elucidated here is Platonic in spirit.^35 Insofar as we are
inclined to hold that it is better that one’s mode of being be non-relative than relative,
we will be inclined to prize the realm of subsistence (Plato’s realm ofBeing) over the
realm ofbeing-there(Plato’s realm ofBecoming). If having a relative mode of being
induces a kind of dependence on that to which that mode is relative, and dependence
is an imperfection, then non-relative modes of being are, in this respect, more perfect
than relative ones. To use the terminology introduced in the introduction, non-
relative modes of being are of ahigher orderthan relative modes of being. That said,
insofar as we are inclined to value malleability, causal interaction, and progression
towards perfection, we might favorbeing-thereover subsistence. As Russell (1997:
100) pointed out, our differences in temperament and outlook will determine which
realm we concentrate our attention on.
(^34) See also Stebbing (1917), Moore (1927: 102–5), and Stein (2009: 10–11).
(^35) Interestingly, Ward (2008: 31–41) argues that Plato needs a notion of systematic homonymy to
explain how the way in which the form of F is F differs from the way in which something that partakes in
this form is F. She also suggests that Aristotle was probably influenced by this aspect of Plato’s metaphysics.