Does talk of relative and non-relative modes of being commit us to thinking of
modes asfirst-order properties? No. Talk of one-place and two-place existence
can be understood in terms of second-order features. If we think of existence as
a second-order relation, as many semanticists do, then we could say instead that the
second-order feature defined on properties of material objects is the three-placed
relation having a common instance at a region. This relation is what is expressed by
“some... is... (at R).”And we should also say that the second-order feature defined
on properties of abstracta is the two-placed relation having a common instance. Even
on this scheme, existence is systematically variably polyadic. We can then introduce in
the standard wayfirst-order properties of objects via appealing to the relation of
identity, thus enabling us to definefirst-order properties of spatiotemporally relative
existence and absolute existence. The fundamental existential notions are still primary
from the metaphysical perspective. But since it makes exposition easier to speak in
terms of thefirst-order notions, this is what I will do in the remainder of this chapter.
We have now explored a view according to which existence is a systematically
variable feature. Given such a view, there is considerable pressure to hold that
existence is an analogous feature, since prima facie, systematically variable features
are at best analogous. (I presume there is no temptation to think of the generic form
of existence as ameredisjunction of being and being-there.) Let us now explore a
second view with the same implication.
2.4.2 Being and Being-in
The previous ontological scheme was inspired by Plato. It is now appropriate that we
turn to one inspired by Aristotle. According to one of philosophy’s founding myths,
Aristotle brought Plato’s forms down to earth, reversing the previous ontological
order.^36 On the ontological scheme thereby birthed,substancesenjoy ontological
priority whereasattributesenjoy a second-class kind of being. I’ll cash out this
ontological reversal via a description of a view in which substances enjoy a higher
order of being than attributes.
On this view, attributes are not“self-standing”entities. Rather, theyexist in
substances. Let us explore a view that takes the expression“exists in”as maximally
perspicuous. According to this view, there are two ways to exist. The kind of existence
had by an attribute isbeing-in: the existence of an attribute is strictly and literally
relative to something else, a substance. The logical form of the mode of existence of
attributes is two-placed:x exists in y, where any suchyis always a substance in which
xinheres. On this view,inherenceneed not be taken as a fundamental notion:
inherence reduces tobeing-in;x inheresinyif and only ifxexists iny.^37
(^36) See Matthews (2009: 154).
(^37) Lowe (2004) distinguishescharacterization, the fundamental tie between an accident (what he calls a
“mode”) and its bearer, fromontological dependence, which a mode bears to its bearer. He also claims that a
fact that a given mode depends on a given bearer is constituted by the obtaining of the characterization