The second mode of existence recognized by this view isabsolute being, the kind
enjoyed by substances. The logical form of this mode of existence is one-placed:
xexistssimpliciter. The mode of being of substances is prior to the mode of being of
attributes: to grasp fully the mode of being of an attribute one must be acquainted
with the mode of being of substances, and understand that what it is for an attribute
to be is for it to be in a substance.
Many friends of modes of being have held that the mode of being of a substance is
distinct from the mode of being of an attribute. According to the view articulated
here, they were right to do so. For on this view,beingis a systematically variably
polyadic feature: when restricted to substances it is one-placed, but when restricted to
adjectival entities it is two-placed. Systematically variably polyadic features are not
good candidates for being perfectly natural: better to hold thatbeingisanalogous
and that the modes of being of substances and adjectival entities are prior tobeing
simpliciter.
This view captures the intuitions had by a wide variety of philosophical greats. Its
source, as suggested earlier, is Aristotle, who in theCategoriesdiscussed what isina
substance but not as a part of that substance.^38 But many Aristotelians and non-
Aristotelians have embraced it as well. Unsurprisingly, on the side of Aristotle, we
find Averroes (1984: 69–70), who holds that only substances exist absolutely while
items from the other categories exist relatively, and Aquinas (1961 218-19; 1993:
92 – 3), who distinguishes that which exists in itself from that which exists in some-
thing.^39 Many other medieval philosophers held a similar view.^40 But even Descartes
(1991a: 31) continued to accept a distinction between substance and mode, with
the latter existing in the former.^41 Still much later, the German metaphysician
Baumgarten (2014: 136–8) distinguishes between the mode of being of substances,
which issubsistence, from that of accidents, which isinherence, while also noting that
accidentsexist insubstances. And Kant (1999a: 302–3, A186/B230–A188/B231)
follows Baumgarten in maintaining both this terminology and the underlying
relation. However, on my view, characterization simply reduces to the mode of being of accidents. Ward
(2008: 131) notes that, for Aristotle, the existence of non-substances presupposes the existence of
substance; the account of inherence developed here explains what this presupposition consists in. See
also Galluzzo (2013: 24–5).
(^38) See Aristotle,Categories1a20–25, 3a30–35 (1984a: 3, 6). For commentary, see Galluzzo (2013: 21–6,
36). See also Coffey (1938: 46, 59). Corkum (2009) presents several interpretations of what Aristotle means
by 39 “in,”but the“existential”approach suggested here is not one of them.
For commentary on Averroes on the being of accidents, see Galluzzo (2013: 171–5) and Gilson (1952:
42). Aquinas’s commitment to understanding the mode of being of accidents as relative was notfirm,
however. See Donati (2014: 155 40 – 6). For more on Aquinas, see Galluzzo (2014: 218–23).
Conti (2014a: 262) reports that Giles of Rome distinguished between the mode of being of substances
and accidents, and held that the latter kind of being was“feebler”and dependent. Conti (2014b: 557–8)
attributes a similar view to Paul of Venice. See also Pini (2005: 68, 71–2) for discussion of some medieval
philosophers on the mode of being of accidents. 41
Perhaps this indicates a remainder of Aristotelian philosophy within the Cartesian system? See
Chappell (2011) for a discussion of Descartes and Aristotle on substance and mode.